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From Defeat to Democracy: 
Postwar Germany and Japan with regard to Iraq 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE: 
In this paper I will analyze and compare the process of enforced democratization that took 
place in Gennany and Japan following the annihilation of their wartime regimes in the course of 
the Second World War. In th~se lessons from the past, American policy makers have a rough 
sketch of actions and aims that succeeded or failed throughout the rourse of two different military 
occupations. Germany and Japan present two distinct historical experiences in the creation of 
viable democracies from the ashes of deteat. America now faces a Second Gulf War in Iraq. The 
purpose of this study is to distill a flexible political framework of democratization from these case 
studies for potential use following the war's conclusion I \.\ill focus on three critical political 
developments that American policy makers implemented in the postwar world of the late forties 
and fifties: the political purges of Germany and Japan, war crime trlals, and constitution writing. 
As the paper progresses, I will present the two distinct approaches to these three developments 
and their relative successes and failures. The lessons illustrated here may very well become 
general components in the blueprint oflraq's future. I will conclude each topictu section by 
clearly and concisely describing that rough political blueprint \\'ith regard to Iraq . 
................ __________________ __ 
ii 
RESEARCH METHODS: 
For my research I will utilize contemporary documents of the period,. analyze them and 
show the progression of American policy as it was relevant to achieving the above stated political 
developments. Secondary sources will also be utilized when necessary. A focused comparison of 
the effects these policies had upon the two postwar nations in question will illuminate those 
policies that were successful and those that were deficient. This analysis and comparison will 
serve to create a rough template for consideration in the postwar Iraqi order. The case studies 
will be broken down into topics first and then by nationality. I will consult sources on the extent 
ofBa'thist influence in Iraq in order to ground the template in reality. 
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Denazification and Political Purges in Postwar Germany 
America initiated denazification in Germany when wartime passion was still high. The 
program of systematic political purges over-achieved its own objectives, creating problems for 
other important occupation objectives and did not help foster democracy in Germar1y. In 1948, 
following the conclusion of America's denazification program, the U.S. Congress recommended a 
grant of full anmesty to the bottom rungs of Nazi Party members. 1 Military authorities in 
Germany objected and denazification sputtered to an ambiguous and un-noteworthy conclusion 
Denazification would have been far better served had policy makers detennined in advance a 
J)alTOW and exact definition ofNazi leaders and bureaucrats scheduled for political purging. This 
simple lesson is quite pertinent and timely when considering what not to do with the Iraqi Ba'th 
party and Saddam Hussein's apparatus of repression in the near future. 
Denazification policy in the American occupied sector of Germany derived from Joint 
Chiefs of Staff directive 1067, issued in April, 1945. In brief, JCS 1067 called for a removal and 
exclusion of"all members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its 
activities, all active supporters ofNazism or militarism and all other persons hostile to Allied 
purposes ... from public office and from positions of importance in quasi-public and private 
enterprises."2 This entailed a review of anyone currently seeking political office or employment in 
civic, financial,·educational, industrial, commercial, agricultural and media related fields. In total, 
virtually any gainful employment with the notable exception of manual labor. Clearly, JCS 1067 
intended to denazify Germany in its entirety, not just German government. The directive also 
1
Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1945 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957), 153. 
2
Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., "Dire<.:tive of the United States Joint ChiefS ofStafftc th;: Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces 
of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany (JCS 1067)," in Documents on Germany Under Occupation, 1945-1954 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1955), 17. 
Comstock 2 
called for the preservation of any records of any Nazi affiliated organization, from the police 
services to economic organizations, for the purpose of identii)ring Nazi supporters. 
The statement of policy in JCS I 067 made it quite clear that purging Nazis from political 
and public life was a prerequisite for German rehabilitation. Denazification was necessary to 
prevent the resurgence of a militaristic Germany that could to threaten world peace. JCS I 067 
spelled out that ''the Nazi Party, its formations, affiliated associations and supervised 
organizations," "all police organizations, including security and political police," economic 
groupings and propaganda institutions would be quickly abolished.3 However, JCS I067 did not 
explain how American military government intended to d~1:inguish the "more than nominal'' Nazis 
from the rest of the 'good' German population in cases where direct membership in abolished 
organizations could not be established. This omission and the intent to find and politically purge 
every Nazi in Germany led directly to a massive and unwieldy denazification program that should 
not be replicated in Iraq. 
American armies, as they advanced through Germany and immediately after surrender, 
exercised a great deal of autonomy when interpreting JCS 1067. Accordingly, the early phase of 
denazification during the spring of I945 was disorganized. 4 This disorganization represents one 
of denazification's early flaws. Another problem that presented itself early on was the fact that 
restoring basic government services, "such emergency tasks as getting a supply of water available, 
procuring food for the hungry people, providing primitive means of transportation, and the like" 
3
von Oppen, ed., ~JCS 1067," in Documents on Germany Upder Occupation, 1945-1954, 18. 
4 . 
"The net result was that m the summer of 1945 American military government was operating under at least four different denazification 
policies." in Zink, The United States in Gennany. 157. 
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far outweighed denazification in priority.5 Although policy makers intended the U.S. Army to 
assmne direct governance6 of occupied territory, military forces ensured the fulfillment of these 
services by using 'good' Gennans. One of the first tasks undertaken by tactical military units after 
taking a city or village involved the removal of existing government officials and replacing them 
with other Gennans. These good Gennans "became hard to find, harder to evaluate, and to 
watch."7 The reality of the situation that the Army faced was that most individuals qualified to 
run the German government, particularly civic, educational and other low level functionaries, had 
been forced at some point to associate with the Nazis. Those that did not were either dead or few 
in number. "Military Government Officers in the field felt time and again that the job was 
impossible."8 
Even the process of denazification itself became too much for the Army of occupation in 
Germany. In mid 1945, General Lucius Clay, then Deputy Military Governor under General 
Eisenhower, described the extent of denazification in the early postwar months. His communique 
to policy makers in Washington emphasized the lack of American personnel qualified to review 
the Gennans, and the steps taken to correct this deficiency: ''program of arrest and removal has 
suffered from past lack of trained personnel but is being speeded by shift from combat to 
5Jbid, 158. 
6
This policy was later reversed in a speech by Secretary of State Byrnes in September of 1946. See Chapter on Constitution Writing m 
Germany. 
7
Friedrich, American Experiences in Military Government in World War 1!, (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1948), 257. 
8
Ibid, 258. 
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occupational phase, by steps under way to train reliable Gemlall personnel to assist in screening 
program. ... •>9 
The Patton Incident in September 1945, brought the disorganization of denazification 
among different American armies to the foreground of policy maker's attention. General Patton 
ofthe Third Army in Bavaria attempted to force his own independent form of denazification in his 
area of responsibility. He compared the Nazi party to America's own political system and 
reinstated some officials he deemed necessary to run the government. The incident resulted in 
Patton's removal and replacement, a not-so-subtle signal to other Army commanders that further 
maverick programs would not be tolerated. 10 The whole affair forced Clay to defend 
denazification efforts in Bavaria, now criticized by American press for being too soft and allow.ang 
the German employees of American military government to 'renazifY.' In a letter to Washington, 
Clay listed the total number ofNazis removed from office at 45,000. He named prominent 
officials in various departments ranging from the Ministers of Education and Agriculture all the 
way up to Bavaria's Prime Minister himself: Dr. Fritz Schaeffer, who had been removed since 
their appointment under denazification purges. 11 Clay stated that Schaeffer, "felt our program for 
removing Nazis went too far and would destroy the essential administrative machinery and unduly 
increase the confusion and difficulties of the people." Clay removed Schaeffer under pressure 
from Congress and media to end a soft German policy. However, among Germans, this criticism 
of denazification increased continually for the duration of the American occupation of Germany. 12 
9Jean Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Gennany 1945-1949 (Bloomington: Indiana Universiiy Press, 1974), ¥!. 
1
°Carlo D'Este, Patton: A Genius fur War (New York: HarperCollins Publishers., 1995), 76{).778. 
11 Smith, The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. 88-9. 
12Ibid., 94. 
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The Allied Control Council, a grouping of wartime allies now occupying Gennany 
composed of America. Britain. France and the Soviet Union. attempted to clear any ambiguity 
regarding denazification in early October, 1945. The Control Council Law no. 2listed specific 
Nazi organizations that were politically liquidated. This removed some of the autonomy in 
determining which Germans were 'good' or not, but not entirely. The law only dealt with the 
abolition ofNazi organizations, not he culpability of their members- especially at the mid and 
lower levels of membership. Military government never adequately addressed this problem.13 In 
early January, 1946, the Control Council further defined the phrase 'more than nominal 
participates' in Nazism in its Directive 24. Unfortunately, that definition still encompassed a 
category far too broad to be manageable. The complete submission of local military authorities to 
central military government was avoided, despite the Patton Incident; the Control Council allowed 
some discretion in determining removal and exclusion ofNazis in less important aspects of 
society. Again, the Control Council did not come to the simple solution of limiting denazification 
to the upper echelons of German government and sensitive private enterprises. 14 
Instead of correcting the untenable scope of denazification. America military government 
issued a comprehensive personnel questionnaire, called the Fragebogen, to all persons in public 
office or positions of importance. The purpose ofthis questionnaire was simple: to determine the 
political level of nazism in each individual who wanted to gain or retain a governmental position 
or a job in the multitude of private sector positions covered in JCS 1067. The paperwork 
generated by this was massive. Throughout 1945 and 1946, American occupation officials found 
13
"Control Council Law No.2, Providing for the Termination and Liquidation of the Nazi Organizations." in von Oppen, Documents on 
~.79-81. 
14 
"Extracts From Control Council Directive No. 24: Removal From Office and From Positions ofResponsibility ofNazis and ofPersons 
Hostile to Allied Purposes," ibid, 102-107. 
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this burden on their shoulders and '"the fact that almost every civil servant and industrial manager 
was in the criminal category added further confusion."15 The system was, in fact, virtually 
overwhelmed. 
At this time, as American military government slowly authorized the re-emergence of 
political parties in Germany, Clay found denazification policies criticized within and without 
Germany from the right for being too indiscriminate and from ofthe left, particularly communists, 
for being too lenient. In December, 1945, Clay again referred to the problems of denazification in 
another communique to policy makers in Washington, "[o]ur facilities are now crowded and with 
winter conditions will become quite bad." Clay stated later in his memoirs that "by the end of 
1945 there were in our zone alone more than 100,000 Nazis, classified as dangerous under our 
definitions, in internment camps under guard."16 These Germans were not only excluded from 
office, but they had also been jailed. Military government fO\md that the facilities and resources 
necessary to keep these individuals under lock and key strained their logistical capability. In order 
to screen and release some of these individuals, an appellate tribunal system was "set up to hear 
cases appealed from the local denazification tribunals."17 
Ofthe 1,103,000fragebogens reviewed by January, 1946, roughly 25% had been found 
"more than nominal" Nazis in public and private positions. These 260,000 individuals were not 
employable in any other fashion than menial labor. The numbers of Gennans excluded from many 
aspects of society and/or in jail disturbed many officials, Clay included. Despite the number 
15
Thomas Schwartz, America's Gennany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge: Hal"\'lltd University Press, 
1991), 47. 
16
Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1950), 69. 
17 . . ed link, The Umt States in Germany, 162 
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processed as of January 1946, many more remained un-vetted. Officials already found the 
completed fragebogens a filing nightmare. American officials realized two things: it was not 
politically feasible to drop denazification, as the Patton Incident illustrated, while at the same time 
"experience in the field clearly indicated that it was utterly impossible to handle the job of 
'vetting' more than thirteen million Germans in the American Zone."18 
In order to relieve the American military government of denazification • s growing shackles, 
policy makers decided to transfer further denazification over to German jurisdiction under 
American auspices. 19 This occurred on June 1, 1946, when the American Liindem Ministers 
President passed the 'Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militari~' When 
justifYing his decision, Clay simply stated that a: "[f]actual analysis of the admiPJstrative problem 
was sufficient to convince me that there was no other solution to this problem."20 Although final 
authority would remain in the hands of the military government, the minutia ofthe process had 
been returned to German bands, formerly cleared by the Fragebogen. 
The Law of Liberation brought denazification into German hands and under a unified set 
ofprinciples.21 It effectively removed the burden of-denazification from the American occupation 
and placed it on the Germans themselves. This German law divided suspected Nazis into four 
categories: major offenders, offenders (either activists, militarists or profiteers), lesser oftenders 
or probationers and finally, followers; distinctions borrowed from American denazification. This 
Law reflected the most clear definition of Nazism, and elucidated a range of punishments that 
18Ibid, 160. 
19Ibid, 161. 
2
°CI nee·. . G ay, ISIOD m ermany, 70. 
21
Fricdrich, American Experiences in Military Government, 263-267. 
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included death for the most serious Nazis, imprisonment for some offenders, as well as 
surveillance and minor fines with probationary periods.22 Each side of the political spectrum in 
Germany criticized the Law of Liberation being both too harsh and too lenient. Nevertheless, 
"more than [sic] five hundred .. .local tnbunals or boards had to be organized to handle the more 
than three million people chargeable under the law. "23 
The American occupation retained influence on denazification, and in the autumn of 1946, 
Military Government passed Law no.8, an economic corollary to the purges. Law no. 8 made the 
employment of Gennans who had not passed the Fragebogen illegal for both the employer and 
employee. As mentioned earlier, those who did not clear the Fragebogen process were not 
eligible for any employment except manual labor. Due to the severity of American denazification, 
many Germans and occupation officials argued that "economic activity in the American zone had 
been severely handicapped as a result of its rigid application."24 Nevertheless, denazification was 
indeed taking place despite the considerable difficulties in personnel and magnitude of scope. 
General Clay, conscious of other factors affecting the political situation in Germany, began 
to consider further denazification a liability. Continuing criticism was effecting American prestige 
and straining limited resources with little tangible benefit in return. Clay's solution was to focus 
on the upper echelons ofNazi power. Clay reported that, "it appears most desirable to reduce 
the numbers chargeable under the law, emphasizing that this reduction is to permit German 
administration to concentrate on the punishment of active Nazis."25 At this time he helped pass an 
22
"Control Council Directive No. 38: The Arrest and Punishment ofWar Criminals, Nazis, and Militarists a11d the Internment, Control, 
and Surveillance ofPotentially Dangerous Germans," von Oppen, Documents on Gamany, 168-179. 
23Ibid, 269. 
24F 'edri h, Ameri . n c can Expenences in Military Government, 262. 
25Smith, The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 285. 
Comstock 9 
amnesty program for youth who were fourteen or younger at the time Nazis came to power, as 
well as for Nazis of the lowest income bracket, earning less than RM 3,600 in 1943.26 The effect 
of this amnesty released minor Nazis back into society with no penalties as the economy and their 
potential contribution to it became as important as the purge. 
Following the Law of Liberation and the two amnesties, denazification does not figure 
prominently in Clay's papers until August of 1947. American authorities held discussions with 
German officials to allow "both followers and lesser offenders [the privilege of employment] in 
positions other than ordinary labor" although political restrictions remained in place. The main 
idea was to "cut the load of major offenders and offenders from 700,000 to perhaps as low as 
300,000 ... [and] enable the program as a whole to be brought to an end sometime around 1 April 
1948 as originally contemplated. "27 Occupation officials wanted to release this mass of people 
back into society as reformed individuals capable of contributing to the German economy, instead 
of remaining a burden on it. This represented nothing less than the beginnings of a policy 
reversal; at this point even the two highest categories ofNazi criminality began to get off easy.28 
Although economic imperatives and a desire to conclude the program took hold, even as late as 
the November 1947, London Conference, Clay included the following subparagraph in the 
military government's proposal for the London Declaration: ''the activities of personnel of former 
German armed forces and para-military organizations, as well as potentially dangerous Germans, 
shall continue to be controlled under existing quadripartite legislation.''29 
26Friedrich, American Experiences in Military Govenuneot in World War II, 271. 
27Smith, The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 415. 
28 
"Perhaps the worst aspect of the entire denazification program ... was that it permitted some of the most notorious Nazis to escape." in 
Zink, The United States in Germany, 164. 
29
tbid, 487_ 
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The German controlled tribunals screened and judged roughly 930,000 individuals. The 
final results in 1948 found 1,549 major offenders, 21,000 offenders, 104,000 lesser offenders and 
475,000 followers. The tribunals sentenced 9,000 to serve time in prison, 22,000 to be excluded 
from office, 25,000 to lose property rights and more than 500,000 to pay fines. Most occupation 
officials at the time believed these statistics revealed a lenient approach given the low numbers of 
major offenders and offenders, the two highest categories of criminality. These results succeeded 
in reducing the numbers excluded from political society. Harold Zink, the former chief historian 
of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany found that "when one contemplates the enonnous 
amount of energy expended ·by American military government, the serious interference occasioned 
in other major programs [such as basic government service], the loss of prestige and respect 
which the United States suffered among Gennans in its own and other zones, and various other 
factors, the achievement seems small indeed. "30 
The first policy steps toward ending American involvement in denazification came in July, 
1947. Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1779 superceded JCS 1067; simply put, it fixed ''United 
States policy for the next two years; unlike its predecessor, it deah with denazification in a single 
sentence. "31 In terms of general military government, JCS 1779 increased German authority in 
denazification and reduced the responsibility of military government. JCS 1 779 laid the 
foundations for Germany's economic recovery and both Gennans and Americans considered it a 
more liberal document than its predecessor, JCS 1067.32 JCS 1779 paved the way to the 
30
zink. The United States in Germany, 164. 
31
Elmer Plischke, "Denazification in Germany" in Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans as Procon.~uls: United States Military Government in 
Germany and Japan. 1944-1952 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984 ). 208. 
32
zink, The United States in Germany, 96-97 . 
................. ______________________ ___ 
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conclusion of denazification in 1948, by declaring the program a success and moving on to the 
more important task of creating a viable, "'stable and productive Germany."33 
Gennan involvement in denazification and the purging her own people now moved to the 
foreground ofU.S. policy. Denazification employed 22,000 Germans at its peak, with 545 
tnbunals operating in the American sector responsible for up to 50,000 cases per month.34 Due to 
the need for efficiency, Germans held their tribunals ex parte. Liberals criticized this policy for 
being unfair. The practice stemmed from the shortage of personnel, the desire to quickly denazify 
Germany, and the huge numbers of Germans associated with Nazism. 
In addition to previously mentioned difficulties within the American zone of occupation 
regarding the meaning and definition of ambiguous denazification terminology, a Jack of 
consensus among allies along the same lines led to vast differences in denazification across the 
whole of Germany. For instance, what exactly was the boundary one crossed to pass over from 
'nominal Nazi' to a criminal Nazi? American and British purged in similar fashions, advocating 
their visions of democracy, and the French and Russian authorities purged their zones to further 
the domestic policies ofParis and Moscow.35 
Problems within the policy making apparatus included '"confusion in distinguishing among 
objectives, policies, and operational programs, and aberrations in timing relationships among 
them." This created a situation where policy was developed in advance of any grdlld scheme 
being articulated, leaving considerable room for interpretation by the American military 
33 . hard . Ric L. Memtt, Democracy Imposed (New Haven, Yale University ~ress. I995). 68-69. 
34 
John Montgomery, Forced to be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Gennanv and Japan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1957), 23. 
35Ziok, The United States in Gennany, 165-166. 
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governors, as exemplified throughout General Clay's tenure.36 Initially this caused significant 
problems. Different sectors within the American zone had resulted in conflicting denazification 
programs. Once Washington unified policy following the Patton Incident, control remained in 
General Eisenhower's and then General Clay's hands. These men used their leeway to modifY 
denazification to match the cultural and political situation in Germany in ways policy makers in 
Washington could not have. An example of this was Clay's speeding and limiting of the purges 
mentioned above. 
Because Allied declarations and German legislation divided Nazi criminality into four 
categories of offense, those extremely active Nazis chose not answer the Fragebogen until late in 
the denazification process, when the prospects for clemency had increased. These men gambled 
on America losing interest after their G.I.s began returning home; they won. Stati~ics support 
this criticism. They show that although the numbers of Fragebogen increased steadily through 
June 1949, the percentage of'major' offender convictions declines from a high of .67 percent in 
July of 1946 to .17 percent one year later, where the percentage hovered for two years. This 
trend developed despite an increase in overall denazification program, during which military 
government expected to find more Nazis who attempted to hide from American military 
authorities. Other categories remained fairly constant in terms of percentages. In the end, "the 
stability of the statistics over a three-year period suggests that the boards were exerting their 
efforts in the direction of uniformity of findings rather than an absolute standard of justice and 
36
Elmer Pliscbke, ~Denazification in Gennany," 222. 
Comstock 13 
helps to explain the almost universal criticism throughout Germany that denazification 
concentrated its fire on minor Nazis while allowing bigger quarry to escape. "37 
The dispute about whether denazification was too harsh or too lenient continues to this 
day. Scholars disagree on whether the extent and scope of denazification exceeded or feJl below 
its necessary extent. However, ''those who review the program with hindsight tend to conclude 
that, if anything, the removal and exclusion program was too massive and might have preferably 
and more rapidly been dealt with from the top down. " 38 In Japan, we see this to be the case. 
General Clay himself came to much the same conclusion when he wrote that denazification policy 
"might have been more effective to have selected a rather small number ofleading Nazis for trial 
without attempting mass trials. "39 By initiating the program with inconsistency among American 
sectors, and then unifying them under a fairly draconian policy, American policy makers 
condemned denazification to a harsh historical judgement. Clay's final analysis is correct and in 
postwar Iraq it will serve as prescient advice. 
37 Montgomery, Forced to be Free. 24. 
38Etmer Plischke, "Denazification in Germany," 223. 
39Cl ... G ay, Decis10n tn ermany, 26 I . 
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Demilitarization and Political Purges in Postwar Japan 
The demilitarization of Japan. a political purge of wartime leaders and individuals 
associated with militarism, was a chaotic and seemingly haphazard event that caused great 
resentment among the Japanese people. At its peak in 1948, demilitarization ousted and/or found 
unsuited for public office over 200,000 individuals. In the short term, Japan's demilitarization 
program was a success. Despite Japanese resentment, the purges achieved their purpose and 
excluded Japan's wartime leaders from political participation during a critical tra..nsition to 
democracy. In the final analysis and longer term, only slightly more than 8,000 of those purged at 
the program's peak in 1948 remained un-pardoned and excluded from public office as the Cold 
War erupted. As Japan emerged as a critical ally in America's battle against communism, 
Japanese authorities, with American approval, released the purgees back into politics. This did 
not prove fatal to Japan's new democracy because democratic institutions had taken root by this 
time. Japan's experience in demilitarization shows that a similar 'deba'thification' oflraq may 
only require a purge of the Iraqi regime's upper echelon of power, rather than the extensive purge 
witnessed in Germany. The American occupation oflraq should purge significant portions of 
Iraqi society affiliated with Saddam Hussein's rule, but in the long run the U.S. should only 
require those individuals at its upper levels to remain outside of politics. 
United States policy toward demilitarization in Japan stemmed from two key documents. 
The first was the Potsdam Declaration, in which paragraph 6 states: "There must be eliminated for 
all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan 
into embarking on world conquest."1 The second was a statement ofPresidential Policy relayed 
1"Po~m Declaration," paragraph 6, from Government Section, Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of 
Japan, v. 2 (Waslungton D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 413. 
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to General MacArthur very shortly before his arrive at the forefront of the Sixth Army's 
occupation of Japan. This statement of policy read in part: 
"High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and General Stafl: other 
high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultranationalist 
and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression 
will be taken into custody and held for further disposition ... removed and excluded from 
office and from any other position of public or substantial private authority ... [and] 
supervisory and teaching positions ... Ultranationalistic or militaristic social, political, 
professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and 
prohibited ... [and] will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak ofreligion."2 
Policy set forth by both the allied nations at Potsdam and individually by the Commander-
in-Chief clearly called for a purge of Japanese officials. However, as soon as the army of 
occupation set foot on mainland Japan a question arose: how to accomplish this ta~k and govern 
Japan at the same time? Policy makers in Washington asked this question as well, for embedded 
within the initial post-surrender policy statement is the ambiguous phrase, ''the Supreme 
Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, 
including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. "3 
Thus we see that demilitarization in Japan contained within its own parameters 
contradictory guidelines. On one hand, Washington directed military government to purge 
Japanese governmental institutions and ·society, while on the other hand, Washington tasked 
military government to proceed through existing agencies of those very same japanese 
2Secretaries of State, War and Navy, approved by Harry Truman, "Presidential Policy Statement for Japan !lCnt to the Supreme 
Commander fur the Allied Powers on 6 Sept., 1945," also known as "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy fur Japan,'' from Govemmcot 
Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, 424. 
3
Harry Truman, "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," from Lawrence Beer & John Maki ~.Ml:!h.!Q 
Democracy: Japan's Two Constitutions. 1889-2002 (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2002), 209. Empbasis added. -
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institutions! Immediately then, military government in Japan differs from the experience in 
Germany. In Japan military government was indirect, whereas in Germany it was more direct. An 
explanation for this is simple: in Germany Nazism was a single pathogen that infected the 
collective mind of German government and came to consume it; in Japan, militarism was a cancer 
that spread throughout the government. American military government considered the German 
government dead following the Nazis defeat, whereas the Japanese government was still 
salvageable, although it required extensive surgery. Nazis also made much better villains to 
purge. As one former occupation official himself stated later in life, referring to Washington's 
Initial Post Surrender Policy Statement and its use ofthe ~1erile word 'exponent,' "anyone could 
hate a Nazi, but who could get excited about an 'exponent?"'>4 
Shortly after MacArthur's arrival in Japan on 30 August, 1945, thirty-two members of 
secret societies dedicated to Japan's imperial conquests publicly committed ritual suicide to atone 
for failing to win the war. Although this made U.S. policy in demilitarization slightly less difficult, 
many wartime leaders and their henchmen remained. 5 
The first attempt at political purges began on October 4th, when the Supreme Command 
for the Allied Powers (SCAP) issued the 'Civil Liberties Directive,' which "ordered the immediate 
release of political prisoners and the removal from office of the Home Minister and top police 
officials; it also directed abolition of the Tokko Keisatsu, a special police unit involved in thought 
control. .. and [the abolition of] numerous restrictions on the freedoms of speech, assembly, and 
4
Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Oocupation as New Deal (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 160. 
44. 
5
Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarisation of laJ!!n (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), 43-
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religion.'>6 As a further political aftershock, the Higashik-uni government. Japan's immediate 
postwar Cabinet, collapsed. The Japanese organized a new government under Baron Shidehara 
Kijuro. Shidehara organized this cabinet on the basis that its members were untainted by war guilt 
rather than in possession of any political credentials. 7 Despite the demise of the Tokko Keisatsu, 
many militaristic organizations remained. 
Within the next few weeks, nearly forty new political organizations sprang to life under 
the allied policy of :free speech. Many of these were radical conservative organizations dedicated 
to the preservation of the empire, now in tatters. Take, for instance, the Tenguto or League of 
the Longnosed Goblins. Despite the ridiculous name it was a fdirly sinister organization named 
for a mythical character reputed to teach samurai swordsmanship and dedicated to preserving the 
Emperor System through 'strong-arm men. ' 8 Older and more established organizations persisted 
as well, such as the Great Japan Military Virtue Association and the Black Dragon Society. 
Joint Chiefs ofStaffDirective 1380/15 gave General MacArthur specific instructions on 
how to begin demilitarization in Japan. Issued in early November of 1945, JCS I 380/15, among 
other occupational objectives, called for the dissolution of military and paramilitary organizations 
in Japan. Largely a recitation of previously stated objectives, this directive attempted to give U.S. 
forces clear instructions on military demobilization as well as demilitarization.9 
6 Dale Hellegers, We. the Japanese People. v. 2 (Stanfurd: Staofixd University Press, 2001 ), 444. 
7 Hellegers, We, the Japanese People, v. 2, 461-462. 
8Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarisation ofJapa~t, 43-44. 
9 
Joint Chie& of Staff 1380/15, "Basic Directi\'e fur Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Pmper," from Government Sa:tiun 
(GS), Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Political Reorientation ofJapan, v. ?. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 
1948), 429-433. ' 
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Political demilitarization of Japan began in earnest only in early January, 1946, follo\.\ing a 
directive from SCAP to Shidehara's Cabinet. Policy called for purging the following categories of 
Japanese at the national level: those associated with "(a) War crimes, (b) Career and special 
service military personnel; and special police officials; officials of War Ministries, (c) Influential 
members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies, (d) Persons Influential in 
Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, etc., (e) Officers 
of financial and business concerns involved in Japanese Expansion, (f) Governors of occupied 
territory, (g) Other militarists and ultranationalists."10 SCAP simultaneously issued further 
guidance to the Japanese government on exactly what these categories meant and who was to be 
affected. 11 As in Gennany, a questionnaire was created for individuals to complete on application 
for, or retention of public office. 
Most American and Japanese officials expected the Shidehara Cabinet to collapse 
following these directives, as had its predecessor government under Higashikuni. The Cabinet did 
rnot collapse, although several of its members experienced the purge firsthand, primarily under 
category (g). The Cabinet attempted to reduce the scope and speed of the purge by requesting 
the establishment of Japanese tribunals to determine an individual's culpability. This request was 
denied and SCAP maintained the purge as an administrative affair, not ajudicial procedure.12 In 
479-481. 
10 . General Headquarters (GHQ), Supreme Command for the Al11ed Powers (SCAP), "Removal of Ultranationalists" (SCAPIN 548), Ibid, 
11
GHQ, SCAP, "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office" (SCAPIN 550),Ibid, 482-485. 
12
Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, v. 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1948), 17-27. 
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totaL only 1,067 individuals were removed or barred from office (807 and 260, respectively) in 
the course of the next twelve months. 13 
General MacArthur, under guidance from Colonel Kades (Government Section Chief), 
expanded demilitarization policy in Japan during December and January of 194617. The low 
numbers detailed above led the American military government to suspect that a great Ill8&'1Y 
Japanese militarists remained unaccounted for. A mere one thousand individuals could hardly be 
blamed for Japan's imperial conquests. With this in mind, SCAP extended the purge from the 
national level to local municipalities, and included the family members of purged individuals to 
prohibit their assumption of office as placeholders. 14 Japanese government implemented this 
extension through Imperial Ordinances ~ - 4 of 194 7. Furthermore, a Cabinet and Home Affu.irs 
Ministry Ordinance expounded on the criteria for Japanese screening would be based on; it listed 
nearly fifty pages of organizations, associations and positions which, if linked to the applicant, 
dictated his removal or prohibition from o:ffice. 15 Nearly seven hundred thousand Japanese were 
screened throughout the countryside. By March, 1948, an additional 3,960 individuals were 
removed or barred from office at the localleve1 (1 ,867 and 2,093 respectively). 16 
SCAP next began a purge of economic and business leaders. This economic phase 
followed the pattern established with the political purges, in increasing intensity and scope. 
13Breakdown of Purge by Category: (A): 44, (B): 300, (C): 3, (D): 140, (E): 78, (F): 14, (G): 458, with 30 individuals in two or more 
categories. Ibid, 29. 
14
"There appears to be no justification fur the exemption oflocal executive officials enumerated in General Whitney's meroonmdum from 
screening to determine undesirable persons within the purview of the purge" & "The articl~ simply bars one member of a fillnily from succeeding to 
the power from wbicb another member of the liunily has been removed," Douglas MacArthur, Letters to Japanese Foreign Minister Shigeru y oshida, 1 
Nov., 1946 & 26 Dec., 1946, Ibid., v. 2, 498 & 500. 
15
Cabinet a11d Home Affil.irs Ministry Ordinance No. I ofl947, 4 Jan., 1947, ibid, 508-548. 
16Ibid,v.1,41. 
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Roughly 2,000 individuals were removed or barred from their positions as a result. The economic 
purge was the shortest; establishing a viable Japanese economy quickly exceeded the need to 
prohibit war profiteers :from continuing their business. 17 
Thus far, only roughly 7,000 leaders of Japanese society had been 'purged' under 
demilitarization policy. Excluded :from these figures were those individuals screened and purged 
not in active pursuit of or retention of public office. This category, known as 'provisional 
designation,' "accounted for an overwhelming majority of those removed :from the scene- some 
193,000 ."18 Officials considered these Japanese individuals preemptively purged. 
The final grand total of purged Japanese under demilitarization policy was 201,815. Of all 
categories purged, the military received the harshest treatment with a total of 115,416 individuals 
removed and barred. Under the category 'Additional Militarists and Ultranationalists,' 49,291 
Japanese were purged, although this category conceals the fact that roughly forty thousand of 
those individuals were members of'Ex-Servicemen's Associations.' Imperial Rule associations 
and societies suffered the next highest with 33,572 individuals purged. 19 SCAP also established 
an intelligence agency to surviel the purged individuals to insure that their activities did not 
influence Japanese politics. 20 Demilitarization policy reached its peak at this time in the spring of 
1948. 
17 Hans Baerwald, "The Purge in Occupied Japan, n in Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in 
Germany and Japan, 1944-1952 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 196. 
18 
. Sheathin Harries, g the Sword,. 48. 
19 Secti Govermnent on, "General Sununary of Purge Statistics," Political Reorientation of Japan, v.l, 553-564. 
20BaerwaJd, "Purge in Occupied Japan," 195. 
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SCAP authorized an Appeals Board as early as January, 1946 with the caveat that the 
individuals appealing their status as purgees remained purged until exonerated. Because of this 
·hitch, and the limited scope of demilitarization in 1946, an official Appeals Board was not 
established until January of 1947, when the policy expanded to local and municipallevel21 The 
initial mandate of this Board was very weak until occupation policy called for a reversal of 
demilitarization policy later on, at which time it was completely superfluous.22 Demilitarization 
policy officially ended on the lOth ofMay, 1948 with Cabinet Order No. 62; very shortly it would 
be reversed altogether.23 Burgeoning Cold War politics, particularly America's formation of 
global alliances to contain communism and rising tensions on the Korean peninsula caused this 
reversal of policy and ''the economy was turned back over to big capitalists and state bureaucrats. 
Politicians and other wartime leaders who had been prohibited from holding public office were 
gradually 'depurged,' while on the other side ofthe coin the radical left was subjected to 'Red 
purges. "'24 As this reversal of policy concluded in 1952, "only 8, 710 persons were still 
purgees'\25 
A number of lessons present themselves when considering the reality of demilitarization in 
Japan. Foremost is the fact that only 4% of purged individuals remained excluded from public 
office for more than the six years ofU.S. occupation. This fact subverts the claim that permanent 
21 Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japal!...!:...!,41-42. 
22Baerwald, "Purge in Occupied Japan," 193. 
23 
Cabinet Order No. 62, "Concerning Abolition of Public Office Qualifications Examinatior. Committee and Public Office Qualifications 
Appeal Board," Political Reorientation of Japan, v. 2. 552. 
24
Jolm Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999) 525-526. 
25 
Hans Baerwald, "The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation" in Jon Livin~'ion, Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfather eds., 
Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 37. 
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exclusion was a requirement for democracy, as stated in the Potsdam Declaration. However, 
during these six years another critical development occurred: the first free elections under a 
democratic constitution, and these individuals were not able to participate in (or work against) it. 
Also questionable is the concept of achieving democracy through autocratic decrees: the 
administrative rather than judicial nature of demilitarization stands out in this regard. As one OSS 
assessment stated, "uhimatc and genuine democratization in Japan rests much less on the 
somewhat haphazard exclusion of undesirable individuals than it does on the will and ability of the 
Japanese to utili[z]e an existing institutional framework for the protection and expansion of 
democratic principles, principles with which the purge is in direct conjlict."26 However, 
demilitarization in Japan was not punitive, as it was in Germany where the Allies jailed over 
100,000 individuals and fined one million others. In either case, the destruction of an individual's 
career on the basis of organizational association is a very harsh preventative measure, especially 
when it took so long to establish an Appeals Board. 27 Some Japanese who truly deserved to be 
politically purged managed to escape and even attain employment from the U.S. Army by 
resigning immediately following surrender. The Home 'Ministry's infamous Thought Police are 
one glaring example of this evasion.28 In conclusion, although demilitarization in Japan was 
flawed, it was a success. As a model for Iraq it has more relevance for deba'thification than did 
denazification in Germany. 
26oss Report, in Harries, Sheathing the Sword, 50. 
27 Government Section, Political Reorientation ofl!I!!!!, 45. 
28Han ies. Sheathing the Sword, 51. 
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Conclusions: Deba'thification and Political Purges in Postwar Iraq 
Deba'thification, or the political purges that must follow a United States victory in the 
Second Gulf War, should follow the Japanese model of demilitarization rather than Germany's 
denazification program. Purges modeled after both case studies would remove significant 
portions of Saddam's regime, a necessary step to democracy in Iraq. However, Japan is a more 
appealing model because it was both more controlled and limited, while helping to accomplish the 
same objective of democracy. As we have seen, the denazification purges of Germany quickly 
became consumed with bureaucratic inertia and became a hindrance to the American occupation. 
Even Japan's demilitarization presented nuisances that led American policy makers to allow an 
eventual de-purging throughout society. This is not to say that deba'thification should become a 
clone of demilitarization policy in Japan. In some areas German denazification policy must be 
consulted. In other cases, American policy should reflect Iraq's unique cultural and political 
landscape. When considering the magnitude of this challenge, American policy makers should 
remember that "[i]n the space of a decade, imperial Japan gave way to a more egalitarian, modem 
society .... It was the victors' justice that drove the new monumental undertaking and powered 
the twin goals of demilitarization and democratiza.tion."1 The lessons taken from Germany and 
Japan are the following: 
Rather than spelling out the purges in ambiguous terms, American polic..y requires clear 
and concise statements that define specific organizations to be purged In Germany, debates 
centered on the definition of who was more than a 'nominal' Nazi. In Japan, the phrase 
'exponents' of militarism and ultranationalism continued the tradition of ambiguity. These 
1
Fouad Ajami, Klraq and the Arabs' Future," Foreign Afmirs. January/February, 2003, accessed online via Lexis Nexis, 
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ambiguities may have been allowed in order to afford military authorities a wider net to purge 
society with. However, the downside of confusing and frustrating the populations outweighs this 
benefit. In any case, both purges reverted to focusing on specific upper echelons ofNazi and 
Militaristic power in Germany and Japan respectively. When occupying Iraq, American policy 
makers should go straight to the heart and define exactly who and what organizations are not 
acceptable. The emphasis of political purges in Iraq must be placed on Saddam's inner circle. 
His extended network of control must be abolished, as Nazi organizations were. Controls on the 
members of these extended networks should not be so great as to encumber military government 
with excessive numbers oflraqis as the Gennan denazification experience illustrated. 
Long Term Purgees: Certain segments of Saddam 's power circle must be excluded from 
holding public office permanently. These individuals belong to the inner circle and upper echelon 
ofSaddam's power structure and number perhaps two or three thousand.2 They include top 
membership in the Ba'th Party, and Saddam's many police, security, intelligence and political 
organizations (Mukhabarat, Amn, Estikhbarat, the Mobile Police Strike Force and the Ba'th 
Party's Revolutionary Command Council) as well as the leadership of the Special Republican 
Guard.3 Iraqis at this level of involvement with Saddam's regime benefitted from his rule and 
must be removed to ensure that Iraq's democracy is not hijacked as soon as American and allied 
troops return home. 
Middle Term Purgees: Lower levels of Ba 'th power and less elite military and 
paramilitary organizations also need to be removed from power, although generally for only a 
2 
Peter Ford & Faye Bowers, "Regime Change: How Will We Know When it Happens?" Christian Science Monitor accessed online 21 
March 2003. ' 
3
Samir ai-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics ofModem Iraq (Berkeley: University ofCalifumia Press, 1989), 3-39. 
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period of 3 to 4 years. The Ba'th Party itself numbers some 1.5 million members of which 25,000 
are considered 'full members'. These members must be removed from office for some years, until 
democracy has taken root in Iraq. The membership of the entire Special Republican Guard 
contains roughly the same number of individuals as the full membership of the Ba'th party. These 
troops, along with their leadership must be purged as well. 
Short Term Purgees: Rank and file of Iraq's Republican Guard units should be removed 
from politics for a period of 1 to 2 years. Because these individuals represent the lower nmgs of 
Ba'th power, their exclusion from politics will be for the shortest period. These individuals will be 
able to reenter politics after the initial freedoms have taken root. 
Rather than slowly escalating the purge process, American officials should announce 
immediately which groups fall into the long, medium and short term purge categories along the 
lines listed above. The impact of deba'thification will be greater this way; as oppcsed to both 
Germany and Japan, where changes in scope and intensity during implementation caused 
resentment among the native populations. This also bas the appeal of offering a very ordered and 
systematic approach to removing elements ofSaddam's terror regime. 
As a corollary to individual purges, some departments of the Iraqi government will 
require a closer vetting than others. Security, educational, media and police ministries will 
require far more attention to detail than, say, the railways ministry.4 By k~j>ing an eye on 
important areas of government, American military government will learn both how the Iraqis are 
working and a closer understanding of the political situation. In some agencies the purge may 
need to be extended, while in others it may be reduced. By allowing nonpolitical ministries, 
4 I . ~ raq required a very profound deba'thification at the administrative, ed&catio;.al, i.'"IStitutional and judicial levels" says Ali Allav.i in 
Ford and Bowers, ~Regime Change," Christian Science Monitor, 2 i March 2003, accessed online. · 
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business and organizations to continue, as much as possible, uninterrupted services the disruption 
in Iraqi society will be lessened. The critical political sectors require extensive and careful review 
in order to return Iraq to the Iraqis and eliminate future oppression at the hands ofSaddam's 
minions. 
Some Iraqis tainted by Saddam 's regime will be required to continue their jobs in order 
to keep the nation running. If governing Gennany through direct military government proved 
problematic, as shown to be the case earlier, Iraqi military govetnment will have an even greater 
need to employ Iraqis during the occupation. A functioning economy and government services 
will likely prove more important than purging certain individuals. 5 Keeping in mind which 
organization the potential purgee is associated with will be important in the process. Non political 
fields that are essential - transportation, sanitation, water purification, and similar fields - will 
likely require some Ba'th tainted individuals to continue operations following occupation. As 
witnessed in the occupation of Germany, finding 'good' Iraqis to man simple services will become 
. an immense task. At the time of this writing, evidence is already pointing in tllis direction as allied 
forces occupy southern Iraqi cities, Umm Qasr is a prominent example of the need for lraqis.6 
5
Marc Grossman,~ Assisting Iraqis for their future: Planning for Democracy" in Washington Foreign Press Center Building, 19 Mar 03. 
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Nuremberg and Gennan War Crimes 
The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials was an integral aspect of finalizing Nazi Germany's 
defeat. Only a widely publicized legal proceeding that presented evidence ofthe Nazi's crimes 
would confirm in the minds of Germans what the triumphant Allies already suspected: that 
National Socialism constituted a morally bankrupt ideology that had no place in the affairs of man. 
Once achieved, this objective helped ensure that the road to democracy in Germany nevei again 
faced a dictator like Adolf Hitler or his minions again. The International Military Tribunal 
indicted both key perpetrators of war crime and -the Nazi governmental organs that these 
perpetrators represented. The Allies convicted a greater percentage of individuals than the 
governmental organs. American representatives believed and argued that the crux of the trial 
rested on proving the Nazi's intent and conspiracy to launch aggressive war. However, any war 
crime trial based on this format in Iraq will face significant· difficulties, despite the success of 
Nuremberg. The transference of the Nuremberg formula to the Far East and the Tokyo Trials did 
not succeed. This cross-cultural incompatibility presents itself again, even more prominently, in 
Iraq. 
American military tribuna.Js at Dachau tried a far greater number of Germans than the 
Nuremberg trials in less publicized proceedings. These proceedings, however, did not present any 
particularly radical developments in international war crime Jaw. The conviction ratio was much 
higher than Nuremberg's, and more death sentences were delivered. The Dachau trials made no 
mark on fostering democracy in Germany; military authorities intended them to punish 
perpetrators of specific war crimes against American POWs rather than Nuremberg's wider goal 
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of discrediting the very concept of Nazism. 1 This paper will emphasis the groundbreaking 
Nuremberg trials. 
During the course of the war, Allied governments denounced the reported excesses of the 
Nazi regime but did not make any firm commitment on how or when the intended to transform 
their words into action until the Moscow Declaration of 1943. Due to the accumulation of 
evidence streaming back from the advancing allied armies, such a statement became necessary. 
Signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and (ironically) Stalin, the declaration proclaimed that ''those 
Gennan officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for, or have 
taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the 
countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and 
punished according to the laws ofthese liberated countries and of the free governments which will 
be created therein". The Declaration concluded that major war criminals, "whose offenses have 
no particular geographical localisation ... will be punished by the joint decision of the 
Governments of the Allies".2 The Allies never specifically defined who the major war criminals 
were, how they would be tried and when this trial was scheduled to take place. 
Following the London Talks during the months of September and August, 1945, the 
Allies finally agreed upon a framework for the major war criminals. The newly created 
International Military Tnbunal (henceforth referred to as the Tnbunal) possessed a simple 
purpose, one that echoed the Moscow Declaration. It called for the ''trial of war criminal.;; whose 
offenses have no particular geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their 
1
Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957), l45--H9. 
2 
Excerpt from The Moscow Delcaration, l Nov 1943, from Bradley F. Smith, The American Road to NuremN¥. The Documen.!!!:Y 
Record. 1944-1945 (Stanfurd: Hoover Institution Press, 1982}, 13 & 14. 
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capacity as member of organizations or groups or in both capacities".3 Article 6 of the Tribunal's 
Charter spelled out the crimes charged against the Nazis. There were three acts of criminality: (a) 
crimes against peace, the conspiracy, preparation and act of waging aggressive war; (b) war 
crimes, atrocities against civilians and prisoners of war as well as devastation not justified by 
military necessity; and finally, (c) crimes against humanity, atrocities of political. racial or 
religious grounds whether or not legal in the country where perpetrated. 4 The Allies also released 
the official indictment against twenty-four surviving Nazi leaders and six "Groups or 
Organizations" (organs of government relating to security, police, intelligence, political and 
military leadership). The list included names and organizations easily agreed upon such as 
Hermann Goering, Ernst Kaltenbrunner and die Schutzstaffeln (SS) to those that the Allies did 
not always agree upon, such as Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and die Reichsregierung 
(Reich Cabinet).5 
The process of indicting organizations was unprecedented in international law. This 
portion of the trial rested upon the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition of conspiracy to commit crime. In 
this tradition, organizational guilt was derived from a group of individuals or an organization 
coming together with express intent to commit and knowledge of the crime charged to the 
defendants. One difficulty faced by American representatives was convincing French and Russian 
3
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delegations to agree to this concept. Due to the preponderance of major war criminals already in 
U.S. custody, the American indictments ofNazi organizations and the conspiracy charge passed 
into the Charter. 
The American delegation at the London Talks pushed for indicting organizations because 
of the sheer scale and magnitude ofNazi crime. The Departments of State, War and the Navy 
eventually agreed that if war crime indictments were only charged against individuals, the greater 
crime would go unpunished do to the expectation that some war criminals would inevitably 
escape punishment.6 By indicting and then (they hoped) convicting the Nazi organs of 
government, the Allies wanted to deprive national socialism of any moral legitimacy. 
Organizational guilt removed the possibility of some Gennans claiming that national socialism was 
a morally permissible ideology corrupted by imperfect men and women. Additionally, by 
convicting the very notion of national socialism through its organizations, the Allies hoped to 
avoid a situation similar to the inter-war years of the 20's and 30's, in which Germans claimed 
'"that an admission of war guilt was exacted from them under duress".7 
The twenty-four indicted defendants faced four counts at Nuremberg. They were as 
follows: count one, ''The Common Plan or Conspiracy"; count two, "Crimes Against Peace"; 
count three, "War Crimes"; and count four, "Crimes Against Humanity''. Article 6(a) of the 
Tn'bunal's Charter served as the basis for counts one and two, while Article 6(b) & 6(c) served as 
the foundation for counts three and four respectively.8 
6
"Tbe attempt to try these crimes on the basis of the separate prosecutions of!arge numbers of individuals will only make good the Nazi 
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Count one, known as the conspiracy count, was perhaps the most important of the 
charges; if a substantial portion ofthe defendants were found guilty, it would provide a legal basis 
for war guilt. Count one also cited pre-war crimes against humanity as well as those committed 
during the course of the war as part of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war, and thus 
transfonned any question of action within Germany's sovereign territory representing a crime 
outside the Tribunal's purview into a moot point.9 Theoretically, the Tribunal already 
accomplished this last point in Article 6(c) of the Tribunal's Charter, but questions remained 
about the legality of convicting individuals for breaking laws that did not exist when the crime 
they defended against was committed. For instance, in pre-war Germany the persecution of 
Jewish practitioners was legal and encouraged. By framing those infamous Nuremberg Laws as 
part of the Nazi conspiracy to prepare the German people for an illegal and aggressive war (the 
acquisition of Austria, the invasion of Poland and the world war that ensued), those crimes against 
humanity became chargeable under international law, ipso facto removed from the issue of 
sovereignty. The conspiracy count also provided a framework for the allegations made against 
the six Nazi groups and organizations under the indictment. Without this count, much of the 
potency ofNuremberg would have been lost. 
Counts two, three and four constituted the most straightforward aspects of the trial. The 
conviction on these counts required only an adequate presentation of fucts, and tying the 
defendants to the crimes through their own documentary trail. That the crimes took place was 
not in dispute, in most cases, only the level of participation by the defendants. France and the 
9
"Th I . e conunon P an or conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as typical and systematic means, and the defendants determined 
upon and committed, Crimes against Humanity, both within Germany and within occupied territories ... ill execution oftbt plan for prepariag 
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Soviet Union drafted the specific and revolting war crimes and crimes against humanity charges 
under counts three and four. These counts consumed the most amount of paperwork and time 
because ofthe extensive evidence avai1able. 10 
The America prosecution team, led by Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, opened the 
trial with the goal of presenting the overarching plan and conspiracy of Nazism in Germany. This 
goal was nothing less than count one in its entirety. The Prosecution encountered difficulties in 
translations; the defense, for instance, did not receive translations of all evidence presented against 
it. In some cases the prosecution presented only 'staff evidence analysis,' or English summaries 
of German documents. Despite these problems, the prosecution presented a historical picture of 
how the Nazis rose to power, including incriminating statements by many of the individuals in 
writing or speech. Hitler's book Mein Kampf showed intent to wage aggressive war, the Nazi 
seizure of power illustrated the :first actions taken to achieve this intent. Concentration camps 
were constructed, according to Goering's book Reconstruction of a Nation, ·with the express 
purpose of securing and maintaining that power. Later, speeches by Nazi officials further drove 
the prosecution's charge home. The prosecution also vividly described Nazi Germany's naked 
aggression against its European neighbor states. 11 
The trial moved on to present evidence against the indicted organizations. Cases against 
the individual defendants followed the organizations. The defense then took center stage and 
presented its own case on behalf of the defendants. For the purpose of clarity, this paper will 
focus on the cases against a limited number of individual defendants and organizations: Hans 
10
Drexel Sprecher, Inside the Nuremberg Trial: A Prosecutor's Comprehensive Acc.ount, v. I (Lanham: University Press of America, 
1999), 100. 
11 Ibid, 213-420. 
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Frank, Herman Goering and Hans Fritzsche as well as the organizations: Die Schutzstaffeln (SS), 
the Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) and the Gennan General Staff and High Command 
(General Stafi). As mentioned, the organizations were tried first. 
Allied prosecution charged the SS and the Ge~'tapO fully and under all four counts of the 
indictment. The General Staff faced charges under counts one and two regarding aggressive war, 
but only with the execution (not conspiracy and planning) of counts three and four regarding wac 
crimes and crimes against humanity. 12 
When presenting evidence against the SS, the prosecution possessed an abundance of 
material. Rather than dispute the evidence, ''the defense endeavored to show that the SS was a 
fragmented, diverse organization and that members of one part of the SS often did not know of 
the actions of the other parts."13 The defense called a variety of witnesses to the stand with this 
intent in mind. The SS, its subsidiary and affiliated organi7.ations (Waffen SS, SD and the 
infamous Einsatzgruppen, charged with the execution of some of Germany's most heinous acts of 
genocide during the Holocaust) did present a complicated network but the Tn"bunal did not 
conclude that the SS as an organization was innocent. Accordingly, "the Judgement of the 
Tribunal declared that the SS was a criminal organization within the meaning of the [IMT] 
Charter."14 
The Gestapo faced a similar abundance of evidence. Additionally, the Einsatzgruppen 
featured prominently (due to the interwoven nature of police and security organizations, and allied 
12~Intemational Military Tribunal, Indictment Number I, Appendix B.,, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 70-72. 
13Sprecher, Inside the Nurember Trial, 1173. 
14Ibid, 1194. 
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misunderstandings regarding the actual division of control, this paramilitary commando group 
appeared in both cases) regarding its activities in occupied Russia. Gestapo acti\<ities included the 
suppression of democracy and the extermination of minorities inside of Germany. 15 Defense 
witness Dr. Karl Best attempted to show that the Gestapo was an amalgamation of police and 
security officials rather than a voluntary organization as charged under Count One (conspiracy), 
and that furthermore, it included a large group of individuals such as typists, janitors and minor 
functionaries who were compelled to join. Again, specific war crimes were not contested, 
although often the defense attempted to foist them off as the work of related organizations such 
as the Einsatzkommandos of the Einzatzgruppen. Essentially, the defense attempted to take 
advantage ofNazi Germany's complex and loosely affiliated organizational structure with the 
intent of painting a picture in which only individual guilt could be proven As in the SS case, the 
Tnbunal did not waver and declared the Gestapo a criminal organization 16 
The case against the General Staff represented the most difficult case for the prosecution 
to drive home. The prosecution faced little difficulty when endeavoring io prove that planning for 
aggressive war took place. However, the General Staff represented the smallest of all indicted 
organizations (about 130 members), and was defined more easily as a group than an organization, 
even in the indictment. 17 Prosecutors used evidence of anti-partisan warfare in Russia and Poland 
and the summary executions of Allied Commandos and Paratroopers as evidence of war crime 
15Ibid, 447-458 .. 
16Ibid, 1195-1203. 
.. . 
17 "F~in~ in such ~pacities and in association u a gro•p at the highest level in the German Armed Forces Organizatior. ... ~ in 
International Mihtaiy Tnbunal.lndlctment Number I, Appendix B", Nazi Conspirac:y and Aggression, 73. Emphasis added. 
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guilt. 18 Defense of the General Staff centered around the assertion that it was not an organized 
group, that it did not plan for aggressive war, nor was it responsible for crimes committed by 
paramilitary units such as the Einsatzgruppen and finally, had opposed Hitler's swnmary 
execution orders. 19 These arguments proved telling when the Tribunal gave judgement. Because 
of the small·size ofthe General Staff, and its dubious classification as an organization under the 
indictment, the Tnbunal "stated that no declaration of criminality should be made with respect to 
the General Staff."20 The Tribunal believed a more appropriate course of action was the trial of 
individual perpetrators of specific war crimes. 
Herman Goering faced all four charges under all four counts of the IMT indictment, while 
Hans Frank and Hans Fritzsche faced charges under counts one, three and four. Goering's and 
Frank's charges reflected direct responsibility for and participation in all applicable charges, while 
Fritzsche's charges only accused direct responsibility and participation in count one and 
encouragement of counts three and four. 21 
Goering's case presented the most documentation of any individual tried at Nuremberg. 
Most individuals had already been implicated during the previous cases presented against Nazi 
organizations of which many were members. Prosecutors used Goering's own prewar writings as 
a virtual admission of guilt. The prosecution also showed his status as Hitler's heir apparent and 
as a leading architect of Jewish persecution and genocide.22 When Goering's defense beg~ many 
18 
"de th ber . Sprecher, Inst e Norem g Tnal. 459-568. 
19Jbid, 1214-1230. 
20Ibid, 1379. 
21
"Intematiolllll Military Tribunal, Indictment Number I, Appendix N, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 57,60 & 68. 
22 . Sprecher, lnstde the Nuremberg Trial, 494-496. 
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officials expected and feared that he would make use of his trial as a platform to re-establish Nazi 
ideology and tum the occasion into a propaganda platform. AJthough he seemed quite pleased 
with his own defense, "neither Goering nor his witnesses had shaken ·either [the] authenticity or 
[the] impact" of the documents proving his guilt.23 Following his conviction on all counts and 
shortly before his scheduled execution, Goering conunitted suicide.21 
The IMT indicted Hans Frank, a leading member of the Nazi party since its conception, on 
Count One for his role in the Nazi conspiracy, as well as Counts Three and Four due to his role as 
military governor ofPoland and the atrocities committed under his direction. Frank's own 
relative cooperation during the trial represents one of the more unusual cases at Nuremberg. He 
gave up an extensive personal diary to the prosecution which proved useful in many of the other 
cases. Numerous statements by Frank added additional weight to the evidence against him found 
in the diary.25 Frank continued on his unique defense and stated publicly that, "I am possessed of 
a deep sense of guilt."26 Frank's strategy involved making statements of remorse, as this one 
illustrates, without actually declaring personal responsibility (true guilt). Frank"s counsel, 
meanwhile, attempted to pin most of the Polish atrocities on easily culpable individuals and 
organizations like the dead Rimmler and his SS. Frank, possessed either of true remorse or 
insanity, eventually admitted responsibility in the extermination of German and Polish Jewry, 
n . Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Tnals(New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1992), 340. 
24Jbid, 609. 
25 
"We have to understand that the purpose of this whole war is to expand the livi:tg space for our people in a natural mar.ner." Frank 
Speech at Galicia, 1942, in Sprecher, Inside the Nuremberg Trial, 509. 
26Ibid, 897. 
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adding his famous remark, "a thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany will not have 
been erased.'m The Tribunal found Frank guilty; he was later executed by banging. 
Hans Fritzsche, an official in the Reich's Propaganda Ministry, found himself facing 
charges on participation in the general Nazi com;piracy, as well as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity because ofhis propaganda incitement. Fritzsche signed a confession while in Soviet 
custody earlier in Moscow, a confession he revoked at the trial. Prosecutors succeeded in 
establishing that Fritzsche did indeed represent a link in the Nazi's propaganda chain, but they 
were not able to link him to any conspiratorial meetings. 28 His defense focused on this inability, 
showing that he did not attend meetings other conspirators were at, and that he merely 
implemented instructions from policy makers (leading primarily to Josef Goebbels ). 29 The 
Tribunal found that he was not guilty of conspiracy and that it was "not prepared to hold that they 
[strong statements of propagandist nature] were intended to incite the German people to commit 
atrocities on conquered peoples, and he cannot be held to have been a participant in the crimes 
charged."3° Fritzsche represents one of the three Nazis found not guilty. 
In total, the Nuremberg War Crime Trials succeeded in permanently erasing Nazism. War 
crime trials in Iraq must emulate this goal and forever abolish any politicallegitin1acy that Saddam 
Hussein and his Ba'th party possess. The extensive docunrentary history ofthe Nazis' crimes is 
both detailed and damning. In Iraq, the evidence must be equally detailed and damning. As an 
ideology, Nazism saw its autopsy and funeral at Nuremberg. In order to ensme a sound def-eat 
271bid, 899. 
281bid, 533-547. 
291bid, 1088-1105. 
301bid, 1409. 
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ofBa'th power and Saddam Hussein's legacy in Iraq, a similar judicial autopsy and funeral must 
take place. This is not to say that there are no criticisms of how the trials were conducted. 
Translation difficulties immediately come to mind. Some critics found that the trials gave 
advantages to the prosecution. For instance, the Tribunal allowed submission of evidence during 
and even following the defense's case, a typically unheard of practice. The reasoning behind this 
explained that due to the difficulty of collecting evidence in the war-tom nation, the prosecution 
needed some allowance for new evidence. It also had the effect of keeping the defense off guard 
and unprepared. Some critics denounced the concept of organizational guilt, which allowed 
future trials of individuals based solely on their association with Nazi organizations declared 
guilty. Following Nuremberg, judges decided that "conviction of a defendant, prosecuted for 
membership in an organization declared criminal, required proof that the defendant had joined 
voluntarily and that the defendant knew that the organization er,gaged in crime as defined in 
Article 6 of the [IMT] Charter."31 This decision eased much of the criticism over organizational 
guilt. Additionally, General Lucius Clay's denazification program assumed responsibility for 
minor functionaries ofNazi organizations and from there eventually these Nazis came under the 
jurisdiction of Germans themselves. 32 
31 
Taylor, The Anatomy oftbe Nuremberg Trials, 557-558. 
32
See Denazification Paper, above. Also, Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials. 278-280. 
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Tokyo and Japanese War Crime Trials 
American and Allied prosecution of war crimina.Js in postwar Japan did not help promote 
Japanese Democracy. The trials, including but not limited to the Tokyo based International 
Military Tnbunal of the Far East (IMTFE), accomplished only victor's justice and retribution for 
wartime atrocities. In some cases, as described below, the trials afforded the guilty a platform to 
present an apologist's view oflmperial Japan's conquests. Modeled on the Nuremberg Trials in 
Germany, the Tokyo Trials did not transfer well. At its worst, the trials gave the defendants a 
podium from which they proclaimed the innocence of Japan's prewar and wartime policies while 
casting a shadow of suspicion on European and American intentions during the same period of 
time. This is relevant because at any trial of war crime in Iraq, America will fuce a similar 
situation. 
Allied powers had limited knowledge of atrocities committed by the Japanese military 
throughout the course of World War II. Reports of escaped prisoners and the Red Cross were 
primary sources for the American government. The full extent of Japan's military prison abuses 
remained unknown until the war ended. American government withheld infonnation, on 
occasion, to keep focus on defeating Germany first. 1 However, the Potsdam Declaration 
maintained that "stem justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have 
visited cruelties upon our prisoners."2 Despite this statement, many war criminals went 
unpunished. The United States established "a centre for collating alleged war crimes" in 
Chungking, China during the course of the war that resulted in "extensive lists of defendants ... 
98. 
1
Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing tbe Sword: tbe Demilitarisation of Ja!!!l!! (New York: MacMillan Publishing Comp!llly, i 987) p. 
2~Potsdam Declaration," paragnpb 10 in Government Section, Supreme Cormnand for the Allied Powers lSCAP) Political Reorientation 
of Japan (Washington, D.C.: US GPO, 1948) p. 413. ' 
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with accompanying evidence, mostly in the form of sworn testimony."3 Some estimates expected 
as many as fifty thousand individual indictments following surrender. Nevertheless, only 5, 700 
Japanese ever faced official war crime tribunals. 4 V arlo us national governments conducted the 
majority of these trials, scattered over the vast lands under the fonner Japanese Empire. Although 
full disclosure of these trials may never be known, "according to the most authoritative Japanese 
tabulation. .. 984 initially were condemned to death; 475 received life sentences; 2,944 were 
given more limited prison terms; 1,018 were acquitted; and 279 were for one reason or another 
not sentenced or never brought to trial."s 
America's first war crime trial in the aftermath of World War II, both ea:,"tem and western 
theaters, took place in the Philippines. The trial established more legal precedents than any other 
war crime trial of the period, and is one ofthe least well known. On February 23, 1946, General 
Tomoyuki Yamashita was hung following a conviction of war crimes committed under his 
command in the time between October 911\ 1944 and September 2nc1, 1945 in the Philippine 
Islands. His indictment under an American military tribunal read that Yamashita as commander, 
''unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations 
of the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high 
crimes against people of the United States and of its allies and dependancies.'.c; Aithough news 
coverage was sensational at the time, these charges and their implications are largely forgotten 
3Harries, Sheathing the Sword, p. 99. 
4
" At the same time, the Soviet Union conducted secret war-crimes proceedings aguinst Japa.""leSC who lmd been Cltptured in Manchuria, 
northern Korea, and Karafuto (southern Sakhalin) ... the Soviets may have executed as many as three tlto!IS8lld Japanese as war criminals, rollowing 
sununary prooecdings." in John Dower, Emging Defi:at: Japan in the WakcofWorld War U (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999) p. 449. 
5Dower, Embracing Dcfi:at, p. 447. 
6
Philip R Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crime Operations in the East, 1945-1951 (Austin: University ofT exas Press, 
1979)p. 50. 
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today. Yamashita's indictment never charged him with direct war crimes, yet he was sentenced to 
hang! The atrocities committed by Japanese forces were never disputed, not even by Yamashita's 
own defense counsel, "the defense sought only to extricate their client from legal responsibility for 
those misdeeds. "7 Yamashita's trial centered on his fuilure to fulfill his commission as commander 
rather than his actual misdeeds. His conviction was appealed to the United States Supreme Court 
and upheld. Shortly following Yamashita's trial, military tribunals tried and convicted Lt. General 
Masaharu Homma on a similar basis for his failure to enforce discipline among Japanese troops 
during the now infiunous Bataan Death March in which many war crimes were committed against 
prisoners of war. Further trials were carried out and Americans exe.cuted a total of 51 Japanese. 
The Manila trials carried the highest percentage of death sentences (roughly 400/o of convictions) 
of any Allied war crime trial following World War II. 3 
The bulk of American war crime trials took place in Yokohama, where military tribunals 
ofthe U.S. Eighth Anny directly tried 474 trials. Eventually, "over 1,000 suspects were tried at 
Y okobama; 200 were acquitted, while 124 sentenced to hang and 62 to life imprisonment. •>9 The 
reason for the discrepancy in numbers of trials versus numbers convicted is that military tribunals 
conducted some 'mass trials' due to overlapping evidence between cases. The Yokohama Trials 
utilized the precedents established in the Yamashita and Homma trials. These trials were not 
nearly as deadly as their predecessors, however; only 14% of the accused and convicted received 
death penalties - ofthose less than 50% were ever executed. 10 
7 Piccigallo, The l!!Jl!lllCSe on Trial, p. 52. 
s.bid, 49-67. 
9Harries, Sheathing the Sword, p. 101. 
1 0
Piccigallo, The JaJ!!!DCSe on Trial, p. 83-90. 
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Only one trial made a lasting impression on Japanese society and judicial tradition: the 
International Military Tnbunal of the Far East (IMTFE), commonly known as the Tokyo Trial 
American officials drove the formulation of the IMTFE, and brought with them many ideas 
originated in the European based International Military Tnbunal (IMf). The Charter for the 
IMTFE borrowed the revolutionary concepts of conspiracy to wage aggressive war and crimes 
against peace directly from the Charter of the original IMT. The Judicial concept of'conspiracy', 
already described unique under Anglo-Saxon tradition, made for an even stranger idea in the Far 
East. Americans sought the justification for crimes against peace in the 1919 Covenant of the 
League of Nations and the 1928 Kellog-Briand Pact, but as solid judicial precedents in 
international Jaw, these ideas were weak. As in Germany, this conspiracy clause allowed the 
prosecution to cast a wider net to catch war criminals. This gave rise to a popular conception of 
ex post facto trials and victor's justice to a greater extent than in Germany.11 Some judges feared 
a precedent of judicial legislation, but in the end the conspiracy charge held in the IMTFE as it 
had in the original IMT. 12 As opposed to the Nuremberg Trial, American officials made no 
attempt to put Japanese organizations on trial, as they did with Nazi and military organizations in 
Germany. 13 Successive parliamentary governments ruled Japan during the war and the years 
leading up to it, as opposed to the sole power exercised by the Nazi Party in Germany. Military 
control was independent of civilian agencies in Japan, where in Germany the two were 
intertwined. These two facts drove the abandonment of a quest for organizational guilt. 
11
"The legal categories of the crimes against the peace and huinanity have been criticized as ex post facto legislation on the part of the 
Loodon Conference, in that these crimes did not exist in international law prior to 1945. Similarly, conspiracy, wbi.:h was the linchpin of the cha~e of 
the crime against the peace, was a legal ooooept round exclusively in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence prior to the Cbaners." in Antonio Cbassese, The 
Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a Pqtcemonger(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993) p. 5. -
12n, .... _ _. H M. v· · J · he IWIIUu . mear, ic:tor s ustlce: T Tokyo War Crimes Tria! (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) pp. 34-42. 
13 
Antonio Chassese, The T okvo Trial and Beyond, p. 3. See Nuremberg paper, above, fur details. 
Comstock 43 
However, as representatives of Japanese militarism, U.S. officials took care in "choosing men 
who during the course of their career had held more than one high position in the military and/or 
government". 14 The point was to indirectly convict the organizations by proving that their 
leadership committed war crimes. This goal was not achieved; only 3 out of the 28 defendants 
were recognized by the average Japanese citizen in a postwar Newsweek poll utilizing 
photographs. The most infamous defendant was Hideki TojO, a former Army General and Prime 
Minister from before Pearl Harbor to Saipan's falL 
Emphasizing the focus that the IMTFE placed on Japan's military was the omission of 
specific mention of civilians in chapter 5( c) of its charter. The chapter pertaining to 'Crimes 
against Humanity', in the IMT (Nuremberg), the charter reads as follows: ''murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, or other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population"; 
whereas in the IMTFE (Tokyo) Charter, the phrase "committed agafust any civilian population" 
was deleted. 15 This omission had the effect of broadening crimes against humanity to emphasize 
military personnel and this was the purpose of the Tokyo Trial. 
Another difference between the two landmark trials lay in the fact that at Tokyo, America 
did not press for representation of economic interests. The Japanese zaibatvu, large family owned 
corporations later broken up and then restored by MacArthur's decrees, presented a unique 
analogy to the Krupp fumily in Gennany. Due to time constraints evidence could not be compiled 
quickly enough; the prosecution barely managed to accumulate evidence against the more 
important and prominent military defendants. 
14Harries, Sheathing the Sword. p. 126. 
15Cbassese, The Tokyo Trial and Bevood, p. 3. 
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Of the fifty-five charges against the Japanese defendants, Count 1 was far and away the 
most important. Count 1 detailed the seventeen year conspiracy to wage war and dominate Asia; 
Count 5 adds collusion with the Nazis for world domination, judges agreed later that this 
corollary was implausible. No death sentence resulted without a conviction on Count 1. The 
reason for so many charges is that Counts 6 - 36 deal with individual nations or groups of nations 
that were violated as a part of this conspiracy when Japan attacked. Nation-specific charges gave 
the prosecution greater leeway and avoided the possibility of losing a conviction on the basis of an 
overly ambitious conspiracy charge. Counts 37- 52 dealt with murder and the conspiracy to 
commit it, based on the reasoning, for instance, that military personnel and civilians killed at Pearl 
Harbor were murdered because they died with no advance declaration of war. Counts 53 - 55 
combined war crimes and crimes against humanity. A total of217 charges against the 28 
·defendants resulted in 132 convictions; seven conspirators suffered the death penalty. 16 
The trial itself presented an excellent opportunity for the prosecution to detail the rise of 
each defendant in the context of the conspiracy charge. The prosecution also explained how each 
defendant utilized his individual powers to "indoctrinate and manipulate the Japanese people into 
acquiescing in the militarists' grand design."17 
Of the defendants, two of the most prominent and important were TojO Hideki and Hirota 
Koki (the only civilian executed). TojO was the head of the War Ministry, Home Ministry and 
government at the same time throughout 1941-1944. Hirota accepted a posting as Prime Minister 
immediately following the military's coup d'etat in 1936 and was the Foreign Minister prior to it. 
16 
Arnold C. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, Inc., 1987) pp. 72-82. 
17 Chassese, p. 137. 
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Together they represented key pillars in the prosecution's attempt to incriminate militarism and 
the civilian government of Japan. Ultimately, both came to represent substantial fiill.ures for the 
prosecution. 1be conviction and death of both achieved little in terms of Japan's democratic 
transition. TojO became a popular hero from the ashes of defeat and Hirota a tragic victim. 
TojO's trial presented the worst atrocities committed by the Japanese military, and his 
conviction was assured. The disaster Jay in his own defense and the cross-examination that 
followed. The defendants were required to submit an affidavit presenting their case prior to its 
actual argument before the tnbunal. TojO was no different. He aJso requested that his affidavit be 
published for the Japanese people, and SCAP foolishly agreed. In short, "he achieved two ends. 
He created for himself the persona of an honest, loyal patriot, sincere in his duty and his love of 
the Emperor; and, with closely-reasoned but simple arguments, he justified Japan's pre-war 
policy'·.•• 
One ofTojo's tactics was to cite the economic blockade imposed on Japan prior to Pearl 
Harbor as evidence of economic warfare that provoked Japan needlessly, or in his words, ""waging 
an economic war against Japan while at the same time keeping herself out of actual war ... to 
reap the fruits of victory over Japan without resorting to an act ofwar". 19 TojO also interjected 
the shadow of colonialism in his own and Japan's defense; he claimed that Japan liberated the 
former slave nations under European and American sway. Furthennore, he defended his Emperor 
to the last, presenting him as a man completely reliant upon his military and Cabinet for 
leadership. In a final coup, TojO defeated his own captors in a verbal duel during his cross-
18Ibid, p. 157. 
19
Ibid, p. 159. 
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examination. During this stage he managed to tum questions from the Chief Prosecutor Joseph 
Keenan around to work against the United States, even when the questions bad little or no direct 
relevance to militarism in Japan.20 Thus Tojo, the most infiunous of defendants at the Tokyo 
Trials, turned his own prosecution into a grandstand. This did not advance American and Allied 
goals to present Japan's actions during and before the war as criminal. 
Hirota Koki dealt another severe propaganda defeat to the prosecution. In contrast to 
Tojo's grandstanding, Hirota maintained a majestic silence. One observer noted that there was 
"something moving and mysterious about Hirota's adamantine poise and reticence during the trial 
and afterwards. He reminds me of a dignified Roman senator, or perhaps an ascetic Mandarin of 
Imperial China."21 Hardly the words to describe a disgraced war criminal The Japanese public 
was both shocked and surprised at what occurred next. His conviction and death sentence was 
the closest of all the defendants: only 6 of 11 judges voted for his execution. 22 Justice ROling of 
Holland wrote a dissenting opinion, and found Hirota not guilty at all; this time SCAP had the 
foresight to repress all dissenting opinions, however, and Roling's views were not publicized until 
29 years Jater.23 Because of the dissent surrounding Hirota's conviction, the American and Allied 
goal to show the criminal nature of Japan's civilian government before and during the war was 
overshadowed by the unexpected Jack of near unanimity. 
200ne amusing example: Keenan: "Of course, is it obvious, is it not, that tbe Vichy Government was under tbe control ofdae Hitler 
Government; you know that doo'tyou?" TojO: "I was well awareoftbe lilct that tbe Vichy Government wasope:ating unda' German occupatioa, but 
I consider tbe Vichy Government as tbe legitimate government ofFranoe. It is just as tbe present Japanese Government, operating under the American 
govcmment, is tbe legitimate government of Japan." Ibid, p. 163. 
21 1bid, p. 141. 
22Dowcr, Embracing Debt, p. 459. 
23
cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Bevond, p. 6. 
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The defense, when buried with evidence of Japan's wartime atrocities, could not refute 
many charges directly. Instead they publicized America's own congressional investigation into 
Pearl Harbor. By doing so, the defense showed that prior to the attack, the United States, 
Holland and Great Britain engaged in secret talks with the purpose of organizing and releasing 
guerrilla fighters to engage in "subversive activities, sabotage and corruption in Japan and in 
Japanese-occupied territories."24 Additionally, the defense cast significant doubt on the previously 
mentioned fallibility of conspiracy and crimes against the peace as ex post facto laws. 25 As Justice 
Webb himself stated as President ofthe Trial, "International law, unlike the national laws of many 
countries, [read Anglo-Saxon nations] does not expressly include a crime of naked conspiracy."26 
The Court itself did not allow the defense to fully develop its case that Japan's prewar policies 
were, in filet, not a conspiracy but rather a reaction to international developments that threatened 
Japan's national security. The Court allowed this only in personal statements. This curtailment 
may have reduced the defendants ability to utilize the Trial as a propaganda tool before their 
execution, but it also provided ammunition to those who complained that the Trial was a show-
trial.27 
An outstanding deficiency of the IMTFE remained in its fiillure to indict the Emperor 
himself. As the final embodiment of sovereignty under the Meiji Constitution, many expected that 
Hirohito himself would stand trial accused of conspiracy. The key to Hirohito's immunity lay in 
24Harries, p. 152. 
25Minear, Victor's Justice, p. 61-73. 
26Dower, Embracing Defeat. p. 463. 
27 Ibid, p. 468. 
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his utility to the occupation forces. 28 General MacArthur himself stated that to try a11d convict the 
Emperor would result in widespread chaos, guerrilla warfare and the spread of communism. 29 
Occupational authorities feared that the process of constitutional reform would have been derailed 
and an inestimable cost exacted :from the pace of reform. The Potsdam Declaration proclaimed 
that the Japanese people would determine their own government. Consensus among policy 
makers was that the Japanese people would demand some from of democratic and constitutional 
monarchy. How could American officials achieve both the Emperor's trial and his retention as 
monarch in a constitutional democracy as figurehead (an expected outcome)? In the end his 
absence :from the trial represented measures to ensure a smooth occupation by the American 
government. 30 
As an attempt to establish an international precedent for all time, the Tokyo Trial was a 
dismal failure. In regards to democratizing Japan, its effect was not noteworthy. U.S. interests 
would have been better served by delegating authority to a U.S. military tribunal along the lines of 
the Eighth Army's Yokohama trial, which was low-key, did not draw any particular attention, 
allowed no grandstanding by defendants and accomplished the objective of punishing war crime. 
The Yamashita and Homma trials established the precedent of trying a commander for the crimes 
ofhis troops. Although these trials were later criticized for their lack of judicial precedent and 
extreme severity, similar trials in Iraq will guarantee the permanent removal of Saddam Hussein 
and a small circle of his key leadership. Additionally, as in Japan, no opposition to American 
28
Tim Maga, Judganent at Tokyo: TheJai!!!IICSe War Crime Trials(Lexington: Tbe University Press of Kentucky, 200!) pp. 34-42. 
29Harries, Sheathing the Sword, p. 128-129. 
301bid, p. 127-134. 
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actions will amount to anything more than a lack of approbation in some historical footnotes. The 
Yamashita fonnat for war crime trials should only be used in the immediate closing days ofthe 
war. Because attention on the occupation will increase as time goes by, American policy makers 
will have very little time to enact this type of war crime trial before it becomes politically 
unfeasible. It is much more advisable to emulate a Nuremberg style tnbuna.l, and ensure that the 
defendants cannot use their own trials as one last soapbox to secure their atrocious legacies. 
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Conclusions: Baghdad and lnqi War Crime 
War crime trials vvill prove to be an essential part oflraq's future. By trying and 
convicting Saddam Hussein's gang of thugs for the crimes which they are responsible for, 
America will bring closure to his reign of terror. It is not enough to merely convict and execute 
war criminals. American war crime trials in Iraq must emulate the moral destruction ofNazism 
that occurred in Germany and wipe out any legitimacy ofSaddam Hussein's apparatus of political 
control may possess residually following the war. Unfortunately, relying on the Nuremberg or 
Tokyo war crime trials as an exact framework will not work. Despite this Jack of direct 
compatibility, some general lessons can be derived from both historical experiences. 
Clearly, it will be necessary to place Saddam and his closest lieutenants on trial for 
crimes they have committed against the Iraqi people and his neighbor states, such as Iran and 
Kuwait, as well as for war crimes committed against allied troops as they occur in the present 
war. 1 What is not clear is how this is best accomplished. If Saddam is still alive, which 
government will try and convict Saddam? America's? Iran's? The provisional government of 
Iraq itself? Of course, this question may be answered in the coming weeks; Saddam's survival at 
this point is far from assured. Other officials will likely flee the country. Nevertheless, some of 
his inner circle will remain following the war. A convocation of an International Military Tnounal 
for the Middle East (IMTME), driven by American, Britis~ Kuwaiti and Iranian judges provides 
the answer, and does not preclude representation from any other involved countries. 
1 A potential list includes: Saddam Hussein and his two sons, Uday and Qusay, Izzat Ibrahim, Abid Hamid al-Tikriti, Hani Abd al-Latif 
Til&h, Ali Hasan ai-Majid and Muhammad Hamza ai-Zubaydi.In U.S. Dept ofState, Iraq: Crimes Against Humanity: Leaders as EXJ:CUtiooers, 7 
May 2002, ~ onl~ ~Elisabeth Bumiller, "U.S. Names Iraqis Who Would Face War Crimes Trial," The New York Times, 16 March 2003, 
accessed onhnc. War Criminals from the current war should be added to any Jist as evidence of war crimr. is discovcmi. 
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The IMTME should reflect the variety of Counts that both the IMJ' and IMTFE 
possessed Charges that cover both Iraq's aggressive wars against Iran and Kuwait, Saddam's 
regime's internal crimes against humanity as well ~war crimes represent candidates for inclusion 
in any indictment. Certainly, his overt support for suicide bombers inside and outside oflraq 
represent a clear starting point for specific and easily proven charges. 2 Only by convicting 
Saddam and his lieutenants in all their capacities as perpetrators of criminal atrocities can America 
and her allies pennanently vanquish the Ba'th legacy. 
This will not be an easy task. Even more than in the trial of General Tq6, American 
prosecutors must be ready for Saddam and his inner circle to utilize their own trials as a means 
to secure their own twisted legacies and justify their actions in the minds of the Middle East at 
large. In any trial regarding Iraq's war of aggression against I~ we must expect that the 
defendants will publicly and vocally bring to light America's involvement in the conflict. Owing 
the Iraqi initiated Iran-Iraq war, the American government provided battlefield intelligence to Iraq 
that helped prevent Saddam's defeat by revolutionary Iran.3 In much the same way that T'>jO 
framed Japan's wars of conquest as wars to free oppressed Asian nations from the yolk of western 
imperialism, Saddam and his inner circle will attempt to show Iraq's actions as either American 
sponsored wars against Iran, or defiance of the American Empire on behalf of the Muslim and 
Arab nations of the world; indeed this is part ofBa'th ideology's very essence!4 Similar 
arguments of American involvement will present themselves when detailing Saddam's war crimes 
2 Hassan Fattab, "Saddam Hussein Gives $260,000 to Families of Palestinian "Martyrs" in Gaza," The Associated Pres.~, 13 March 2003 
aa:essed online via Lexis Nexis. ' 
3
Dilip Hiro, "The Iran-Iraq War," in Hoosbang Amirahmadi and Nader Entes..~ eds., Iran and the Arab World (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1993), 49-51. 
4
Samir ai-Khalil, Republic of Few: The Politics of Modem Iraq (Berkley: University of Califumia Press, 1989), 171-I 82. 
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involving chemical attacks on the Iranians. At any 'Baghdad Trial,' the evidence against Saddam 
and his ministers and generals must be both massive and irrefutable to counter what could become 
a judicial fiasco. The Baghdad Trial should also severely limit the ability of Saddam Hussein and 
his immediate circle to make public statements in order to preclude this from occurring on the 
world stage. 
Organizational guilt should not be pursued in Iraq because the necessary conventions 
exist for prosecution of crimes against humanity under various international conventions. 
Political purges, detailed above, will remove the necessary individuals from Iraqi political society 
following the war. The amount of time and effort needed to convict organizations would 
outweigh any tangible benefit from doing so. Saddam's regime can be defeated rmrally by 
convicting its top leadership of crimes committed under their rule. These individual trials will 
serve to destroy any residual legitimacy in Ba'th organizations. 
A conspiracy charge to wage crimes against the peace could certainly be argued against 
the Ba 'th Party; but this charge is neither necessary nor advisable. This c:harge, if attempted 
would vastly increase the period of time under investigation. Charging individuals with specific 
acts of crimes against the peace would be more than enough to prove war guilt in the cases of the 
Iran/Iraq war and the First Gulf War. With America's specific emphasis on weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD} in the current administration's case for the current Gulf War, any attempt to 
prove a war guilt charge regarding current hostilities will depend on the discovery ofWMD inside 
oflraq. 5 If no WMD are discovered, then the administration will find that many observers around 
5
David E. Sanger, "Bush's Doctrine for War," The New York Times, 18 March 2003, accessed online. 
------------------------------~-------
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the world will view any war guilt charges, even regarding earlier wars, as examples of American 
hypocrisy. 
In any trials, the prosecution should not be given any extra powers that will give the 
appearance of favoritism toward the prosecution. In both the Nmemberg and Tokyo trials, 
criticism was leveled that the prosecution carried with it the undeniable advantage of"Victor's 
Justice.' American authorities should ensure that translation facilities and personnel are available 
to keep both evidence and charges available to everyone involved. A specific date for the trials 
needs to be chosen, beyond which new evidence will not be allowed. In Germany, the allowance 
of a second chance for the prosecution to submit evidence was considered unfair. 
Should a lack of evidence present itself to American authorities when constructing a case 
to prosecute Saddam Hussein or any of his top officials and military leaders, they should refer to 
the Yamashita and Homma trials in Japan to convict him for war crimes committed under his 
command. The application of this trial format should remain a judicial weapon of last resort. The 
expansion ofthe Yamashita precedent to political leadership for the crimes would present 
significant difficulty, and the trial would lose potency as a result. Many would charge that the 
trial constituted a complete sham and America would fuce an international public relations fiasco. 
In the postwar months that Yamashita and Homma were tried, other events overshadowed their 
prosecution and execution. This will not be the case in postwar Iraq, and an immediate and swift 
military tnounal would need to execute Saddam and his lieutenants before their captivity becomes 
a drawn-out affair. Although contemporaries and historians would likely condemn the action, 
Saddam's reign of terror will have ended once and for all- and no world powers would be in any 
position to stop the execution. 
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Constitution Writing in Postwar Germany 
America pressed for Gennan self-government within its own zone of occupatio~ creating 
the early Liindern following German surrender, and led the way toward the development of a 
national self-government for what became Western Germany. The entire process entailed two 
separate steps: firstly, the drafting of state constitutions within the American zone and Jastly, the 
drafting of the West German constitution.1 Allied and American policy makers at the London 
Conference established a rough framework to work within. When intervention became a 
necessity to correct what Allied military governors found objectionable in the first German draft 
constitution, nearly all German parties involved criticized the unwanted intrusion. 2 By providing 
only a rough constitutional framework, the Allies ensured that the German final product would 
not meet their specific and unstated requirements for express federalism. Eventually the western 
allied governments abandoned their objections to reach a conclusion. A better reasone.d policy 
would have spelled out exact requirements of federalism in addition to the rough framework; 
leaving as much room for German direction as possible within these requirements. Despite these 
flaws, the military governors of Germany managed the German constitution drafting process much 
more adroitly than that which had occurred earlier in Japan. Although disputes took place, 
military government did not draft a constitution that was forced on the Germans. As a model for 
what American military government will shortly fuce following the conclusion of the Second Gulf 
War, postwar Germany offers more positive lessons than negative warnings. 
1
Golay, The Founding of the Federal German Reoublic,(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 21·22. 
2
"Gennan opinion had united in condemning the military governors fur intervening in matters thought proper fur German decision." in 
Golay, The Foonding of the Federal German Republic, 101. 
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In the early postwar months following the formal surrender of Gennan military forces, 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson moved quickly to establish a policy that would remove Gennany 
as a burden on his department. The War Department held no desire to directly govern Germany 
any longer than absolutely necessary. Under Stimson's direction, "among other~ the Army 
did everything it could to complete its assignment in Germany as quickly as possible, essentially 
trying to make military government a 'going concern' from which the Army could then withdraw 
gracefully. "3 
To achieve this end, Military Governor Dwight Eisenhower and his deputy Lucius Clay 
quickly formulated a policy to shift governmental responsibilities back to the Germans themselves 
with all possible haste.4 Following the Potsdam agreements, Clay worked to schedule local 
elections at the earliest opportunity, stating that these elections ''will give the Germans an 
opportunity to learn democratic procedures on the lower levels before undertaking elections for 
larger units. At the same time, the election of such local officials will tend to relieve military 
government of many duties at that level."5 This led to the creation of the Council of Ministers 
President within the American zone of occupation in October of 1945. Clay transferred a good 
deal of the occupation's minutia to this council, including food, agriculture, industry, 
transportation and prices, "so that it soon took on the character of a central government of the 
American zone.·~ Local elections took place across the American zone in January of 1946 as the 
3 Jobn Gimbel, "Governing the American Zone of Germany," in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Miljtary Government in Gennanv 
and Japan. 1944-1952, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984 ), pp. 92-93. 
4
Lucius Clay, cable fur War Dept., "Transfilr of Military Government to Civilian Authority," in The Papers of General Lucius Clay, ed. 
Jean Smith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 82-83. 
\uciusCiay, letter to Jobn McCloy, "Conditions in Germany," ibid, 67. 
6Gimbel, "Governing the American Zone of Germany", 94. 
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War Department "abandoned its formal efforts to shift military government to the State 
Department and shifted toward a more indirect approach. "7 American military government 
directed the Gennans to elect constituent assemblies in the Council of Minister Presidents to draft 
Lander, or State, constitutions creating ministries capable of assuming greater responsibility. 
In January, 1946, successful local elections that took place throughout the American zone 
of occupation in smaller towns and villages. Shortly thereafter, in June, American military 
government under General Clay pressed for the creation of Constitutional Assemblies. This 
process gave the Gennans a firsthand experience with democracy and at a level where the 
pressure and tension of a national convention was absent. These Assemblies quickly drafted 
constitutions and "after being reviewed by military government, the c.onstitutions were submitted 
to the voters in the respective states in late 1946 and early 194 7 and approved by respectable 
majorities."' In some instances military government did not immediately approve specific portions 
ofthese new constitutions. In Hesse, for instance, General Clay and his staff disagreed with a 
provision that allowed the state government to usurp control of certain industries in some cases. 
Although Clay eventually decided to leave the provision unaltered, he suspended it for the time 
being.9 Military government subjected the powers of the Lander legislatures created by these 
constitutions to its own discretion. 
Secretary of State James Byrnes publicly spelled out US foreign policy objectives toward 
occupied Germany in a speech in September of 1946. He stated that reparations had to be paid by 
7Ibid, 96. 
8
Harold Zink, The United States in Gennany, 1944-1945 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, I 957), 180. 
9 Zink, The United States in Germany, l 8 l. 
Comstock 57 
the Gennan nation, that a resurrection of a strong Reich was prohibit~ and that it was not the 
intention of the occupation to create from interzonal boundaries "self-contained economic or 
political units." Brynes also called on the "early establishment of a provisional German 
government" and stated that ''the American people want to return the government of Gennany to 
the German people."10 This policy statement illustrated the American intention to move quickly 
toward a national German constitution. At this point, even policy makers believed direct 
governance of Germany was no longer advisable or possible. 
Russian intransigence on virtually every point in early four-power Allied talks in London 
during 194 7 led America, Britain and France to pursue a separate, western German constitution. 
After Soviet representatives walked out of the Allied Control Council immediately prior to the 
Berlin Blockade, President Truman stated that the Army would continue to implement "American 
policy to develop German self-government and administrative responsibility."11 
General Clay followed this promise to its fullest extent and pushed for a German 
Constitution as an integral part of US policy. Before the opening of the London Conference of 
1948, where Britain, France, the United States and the Benelux countries debated policy on 
Germany and the Ruhr region in particular, Clay stated in a cable to Washington that "a 
constitutional assembly should be elected ... to begin drafting the German constitution." Clay 
emphasized the need for a central government, federal in nature, that would still be able to 
administer the nation effectively. This requirement provoked an inter-Allied dispute over the 
nature of German government. For security reasons, the French delegation pushed for a 
10
"Stuttgart Speech by J.F. Byrnes: Restatement ofPolicy on Germany" in Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Doccuments on Germany Under 
OccuD!ltiOD, 1945-1954. (London: Oxfiml University Press, 1955), 152-160. 
11Gimbd, 100-102. 
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confederation of quasi-independent states that would be dominated easily. The French stance 
conflicted with Clay's belief in a revitalized Germany. Clay stated that "a loose confederation of 
states cannot possibly cope with the conditions which will exist in Germany for several years to 
come." Clay also pressed for allowing the Germans considerable room within any proposed 
guidelines to write a constitution that would be German in nature, not a foreign imposition. 12 
As the London Conference progressed, French opposition to the timing and nature of the 
establishment of a West German government proved to be a considerable obstacle. Progress 
stalled to the point that Clay advised a British/US bizonal agreement independent of the French 
zone. 13 1bis implicit threat, coupled with the incentive of the Marshall Plan, proved enough to 
force the French into accepting the London Communique, issued in early June of 1948. The 
recommendations stated that the military governors should meet with their respective Ministers 
President and authorize a Constituent Assembly. Guidelines were concise: "the constitution 
should be such as to enable the Germans to play their part in bringing to an end the present 
division of Gennany not by the reconstitution of a centralized Reich but by means of a federal 
form of government which adequately protects the rights of the respective states, and which at the 
same time provides for adequate central authority and which guarantees the rights and freedoms 
of the individual."14 
Military governors among all the wartime allies believed the abolition of the German 
lAnder of Prussia was critical in the development of German federalism. 15 The Allied Control 
12
Lucius Clay, Eyes Only fur Draper, "London Confilrence," 7 Feb 1948, The Papers ofLucius Clay, pp. SSS-557. 
13 Clay, fur Draper, "London Coofi:renc;e," 22 May 1948, ibid, 656. 
14
"Communique issued by the London Six-Power Conference," in von Oppen, Documents on Gennany Under Occupotion, 288. 
I 5Zink, The United States in Gennam;, 329-330. 
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Council Law no. 46 had officially ended Prussia's territorial existence for the sake of democracy 
over a year earlier, in February of 194 7, by dividing Prussia among the occupying powers. 16 
Prussia's long history of demographic and geographic dominance in Germany's political order 
among the Lander and even in relation to the central government was deemed uMcceptable. This 
development, although not directly related to con:,1itution writing in Germany, was directly 
related to the express constitutional requirement of federalism as stated in the London 
Communique, and later in the London Documents. Military authorities did not want to take the 
chance of allowing a dominant regional entity usurp control from a federalized central 
government. With regard to Iraq, the opposite is true. The Sunni dominance oflraqi government 
in recent history is not the result of demographic or geographic dominance, as was the case with 
Prussia. In Iraq, regional autonomy is key to creating a viable Iraqi government ru-.ceptable to the 
various ethnic and religious groups residing there. Breaking up regional entities, such as the 
Kurdish state, or the Shia south, will destabilize federalism and allow further dominance from the 
central government by weakening its component entities. 
In July, 1948, occupation authorities released the London Documents, a more formal set 
of declarations and guidelines on a Western German government, following the London 
Communique's earlier guidelines. The Documents went into further detail on the composition of 
the constituent assembly (one delegate per 750,000 people at the last census). They also restated 
the relationship between military governors and the future civilian leadership fo Germany; the 
Documents directed the governors to allow German autonomy in legislative, executive and 
16
"Control Council Law No. 46: Abolition of the State ofPrussia," in von Oppen, Documents on Germany Under ()(x:upatio!!, 210·211. 
judicial fields with severe limitations on foreign relations, and the power to enforce the 
observance of any approved constitutions. 17 
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The German Ministers President received these documents, and raised some s.~mantic 
objections. They did not want the finalized product to be called a Constitutio~ nor did they want 
the drafting assembly named a Constituent Assembly, as these names implied recognition of a 
divided Germany, something that no political party wanted to associate itself with. The German 
Ministers President preferred Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, as a title for this provisional 
constitution. Rather than a Constituent Assembly, the Germans preferred a Parliamentary 
Council. 18 
Initially, the western allies viewed this as an attempt by the Germans to regain governance 
while avoiding constitutional responsibility. After negotiations, the Gennans clarified that 
Grundgesetz could easily be translated to 'Basic Constitutional Law,' and the allies compromised. 
The term Basic Law raised no objections among the Western powers, and once resolved the term 
Parliamentary Council posed no problems. The Western governments also issued a set of specific 
guidelines in November, 1948 on what the military governors would look for when determining 
whether or not to approve Basic Law. Allied powers gave considerable leeway in terms of 
governmental structure; no mention was made of a separation of executive and legislative powers. 
However, required elements in any constitution were a bicameral legislature, an independent 
judiciary, guarantees of the States' and individual's rights, and expressly enumerated federal 
17
"The London Documents (1-3)," ibid, 315-318. 
18
"Reply of the Ministers President to the Proposals Made by the Military Governors," Ibid, 322-330. 
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powers. 19 The military governors expected that this document provided enough guidance for the 
Parliamentary Council. 
With these guidelines the Germans crafted a provisional constitution themselves, with very 
little further guidance or interference. The Germans crafted a document with the Weimar 
constitution as a model. 20 The Germans presented their first draft of Basic Law to the military 
governors in January, 1949. Following a review in February, the military governors returned the 
draft constitution in early March with proposed revisions. Unfortunately, ''the • .<\merican and 
French representatives objected to what they regarded as undue concentration of authority in the 
central government and a vague division of power between the central government and the 
states. "21 In short, the military governors rejected the first draft. 
General Clay's political advisors agreed that the German draft gave excessive powers to 
the central government, ''particularly in the fields of public ~ public welfare, labor, and the 
press, which bad been specifically excluded from federal control in the London Agreement," and 
further added that Parliamentary Council granted the central government excessive powers in 
revenue-raising and tax-collection. 22 The draft stated legislative jurisdiction in ambiguous and 
confusing ways that would benefit the executive branch. The Parliamentary Council, after 
objecting vehemently, returned to redraft the constitution and submitted it again on March 1 Olh. 
The redraft again failed to satisfY the American and French objections to the centralization of 
19
" Aidt>Mcmoire Concerning the Basic Law Presented by the Military Governors to the President of the Parliamentary Cour.cil at Bonn," 
Ibid, 343-345. 
20
"Even a casual reading oflhe Bonn Basic Law will reveal a striking similarity to many parts oftbc Weimar Constitution." in Harold 
Zink. Tbe United Slates in Germany. 187. 
21 Ibid, 187. 
22CI Dec" . . Gennan ay, ISJOn m y. 421. 
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finance and legislature. "In fact," stated General Clay in his memoirs, "in the financial field the 
amended Basic Law authorized the federal government to transfer revenue from the more 
prosperous to the less prosperous states, a power which would almost certainly have destroyed 
the financial independence of the individual states."23 Again, the military governors rejec..-ted the 
Gennan's redrafted constitution; in their opinion it bad gotten worse! 
At this point, German public opinion began to sour in relation to the military government. 
The Allgemeine Zeitung stated that "it is impossible for a constitution, which from the start bears 
in the eyes of the people the stigma that it exists in virtue of the will of the vi"-tors, to win the 
nation's loyalty."24 Further proposals followed the second rejection on March 1 ~. The military 
governors found that rather than a real redraft, the Parliamentary Council had only reshuffled the 
way powers were listed. The gridlock formed because neither side, Gennan or Allied, wanted to 
upset hard won compromises. The Western allies did not want to upset the London Agreements, 
and the Germans did not want to throw off the fragile balance of political parties that had crafted 
the draft constitution. 25 
Tense negotiations within the parties represented in the Parliamentary Council and 
between the Council and the military governors ensued. Some parties, such as the Christian 
Democrats, announced a willingness to accommodate the military governors as the lesser of two 
evils, whereas others continued to hold fast. 26 
23Ibid, 424. 
24Golay, The Founding oflhe Federal Republic of Germany, 101. 
25Ibid, 102. 
26Ibid, 103. 
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Concmrently, a meeting ofthe Western allies in Washington led to the release of a 
statement addressed to the Parliamentary Council stressing the expectation of a ''mutually co-
operating attitude" in preserving the London Agreement's guidelines. The statement represented 
a veiled threat that if the Parliamentary Council continued to lag behind the military governors' 
expectations, further intrusion should be expected. In addition to addressing the Parliamentary 
Council, the Washington Conference secretly delivered concessions regarding the centraiization of 
finance and executive power that the military governors were allowed to make. Policy makers in 
Washington instructed the military governors to present the concessions to the Germans nt an 
appropriate time.27 The new policy ''was to proceed with setting up of a Gennan government, 
making the best bargain possible."28 Cold War politics drove this consideration. If the first 
attempt at West German government failed, the Soviet Union would have been the primary 
beneficiary. However, the Germans negotiating amongst themselves had no inkling of this new 
policy; they though only that if they did not compromise amongst themselves and the western 
allies quickly, they would regret it. 
A process of political fragmentation began among the German parties involved in the 
constitution drafting, threatening to tear apart the Council.29 At this point, on April23nl, the 
military governors revealed the secret concessions to the Parliamentary Council. The effect of 
this galvanized the parties and they "conceded an administration of major taxes by the Lander to 
the Allies and a reduction of the powers of the Bundesrat to the Social Democrats, but retained 
27Ibid, 103. 
28
zink, The United States in Germany. 188. 
29
wThe breakdown of agreement between the German parties seemed complete." in Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of 
~106. 
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for the federation power to legislate in the concurrent fields 'to maintain economic and legal 
unity,' as well as a provision for financial equalization between the Liinder."30 The French and 
British military governors agreed to approve the draft, and General Clay held out for only a short 
time; he agreed following minor alterations in phraseology that he deemed more acceptable. 
Following the approval of the militaty governors, Basic Law was adopted by a fhll vote of 
Parliamentary Council on May 811\ 1949. 
In conclusion, America and her allies initially presented too few specifications on the 
nature of federalism they desired to see in the German constitution. Statements made at the 
London Conference in 1948 gave the impression of wide latitude in determining the nature of 
German federalism, while the allies really held a very precise definition of that fedemlism based 
principally on the American government's image because of General Clay's leading role in the 
negotiations. By then forcing the issue, the military governors found themselves fuced with a 
politically untenable situation. If the Parliamentary Council collapsed, a huge political defeat 
would have occurred at a critical time during the Cold War. When the home governments 
realized this danger, they reversed course to prevent a fiasco. No long term damage was caused 
by this, but it would have made more sense to have avoided the situation altog~~ by providing 
more specific instructions to the German Parliamentary Council. When guiding constitutional 
development in Iraq, military government can utilize this experience and by providing the proper 
specific advice, avoid constitutional troubles later on. In Germany's case study, as we will see in 
Japan's, the constitution drafting process pulls on historical memory in ways that are difficult to 
counter. The Germans' desire to create a ~1ronger executive central government came from the 
3~bid, 106. 
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recent past, and the model for Basic Law was largely the Weimar constitution. In Iraq, where 
constitutional history bas largely been suspended by internal coups since the latent provisional 
constitution of 1964, this historical pull will not be present. 
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Constitution Writing in Postwar Japan 
Occupation authorities of the United States chose to intervene in the creation of Japan's 
post-war constitution when it became apparent that the government of Japan was both unwilling 
and unable to draft a document of the required scope and power to ignite democracy in the 
shattered empire. A lack of explicit guidance to the Japanese government and its owa intrinsic 
conservative nature created a situation where the unwanted intrusion became required. Once the 
intervention began, it became a grueling cultural ordeal for those involved, particularly the 
Japanese. Great care was taken to hide the American hand behind the final draft presented to the 
Japanese Diet. To avoid intervening directly in Iraq's constitution, American officials have much 
to learn from this case study. Clear requ!rements on the content of any constitution must be 
elucidated at the beginning to avoid intervention Jater on. 
Initial Allied policy toward post-war Japan, stated in the Potsdam Declaration, called for 
the removal of obstacles to democracy and the establishment of civil liberties. As American 
forces occupied Japan, General MacArthur received instructions that expanded this policy to 
include active encouragement of democratic trends. Washington transmitted the 'United States 
Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' to his headquarters in September of 1945. Finally, a Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Directive (1380/15) spelled out instructions to the General in a secret document 
not publicized by SCAP until1948. Neither the Initial Post-Surrender Policy or JCS 1380115 
mentioned constitution writing. Policy makers did not specifY what, if anything, they wished to 
see MacArthur do with regard to a new constitution. Allied policy did call for the removal of 
laws and organizations contrary to democracy and civil liberties. 1 
I 
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Initially, American and Allied officials hoped that by maintaining a subtle occupation in 
terms of constitutional refonn, the Japanese people would create their own democratic 
constitution. The occupation required existing Japanese government agencies to continue running 
the day-to-day affairs of the nation. A lack of American personnel with the linguistic ability to 
interact with the Japanese population caused this situation. 2 
When General MacArthur and the American occupation forces of the Sixth Army arrived 
in Japan, tb.ey had very sparse guidance in terms of exactly how and where the occupation was to 
proceed. In fact, U.S. post-surrender policy was only radioed to MacArthur during his stopover 
in Okinawa en route to Atsugi Airfield in mainland Japan. 3 Following tentative early steps, 
MacArthur quickly assumed the mantle of authority formerly held by the Emperor himself He 
possessed the ego, drive, and maneuvering room from a lack of explicit Allied policy to expand 
the influence of his General Headquarters (GHQ) under the Supreme Command for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP) in Japan. SCAP exercised its power on the general population of Japan 
indirectly. MacArthur did not have the ability to directly control the civil infrastructure of entire 
nation, but he did have the ability to influence those officials at the apex of the Japanese 
government. BLACKLIST, the plan to occupy Japan, foresaw MacArthur's ability to influence at 
the top; it called on SCAP to find and utilize ')'eliable Japanese officials and, insofar as 
practicable, Japanese administrative machinery.',.. When the encouragement of democratic trends 
became a priority, SCAP continued this policy of using Japanese officials over into the field of 
2
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3 Hellegers, We, the Japanese People. v. 2, 438. 
4 
6 Aug 1945, "Basic Plan fur Institution of Military Government, BLACKLIST Operations, Military Go"emment Annex" ftom Dale 
Hdlegcrs, We d~~: 18p!llle!!C People. v. 2, 409. 
Comstock 68 
reform and constitution writing. SCAP initiated both reform and constitution writing where its 
influence was the greatest, at the apex of Japanese government. 
Throughout the occupation, Imperial Ordinances translated into Japanese law directives 
from SCAP regarding the abolition oflmperial Japan's machinery of political repression. 
MacArthur and his superiors in Washington took special care to avoid offending the cultural 
sensibilities of the Japanese people. Preservation of the Emperor became one expression of this 
policy, and it was achieved by working through him, ironically, in the form of these Imperial 
decrees. s Allied objectives focused on ''remaking the political, social, cultural, and economic 
fuhric of a defeated nation," while "dismantling [an] authoritarian structure root and branch, even 
while disclaiming any intention to 'impose' an alien system of government on the defeated foe.'" 
Very shortly, this policy of dismantling authoritarianism revealed the need to create something to 
take its place. The political maneuvers that allowed the Japanese to believe change was not 
externally imposed reached a new level of complication. Again, SCAP began by exercising its 
influence at the apex of Japan's government. 
Under the brief tenure of Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko's Cabinet immediately following 
surrender and occupation, the Japanese government took action to forestall any foreign attempts 
at constitutional reform. Prince Konoe Fumimaro, a minister without portfolio, advocated a 
constitutional review immediately. realizing that "constitutional reform would indeed be a natural 
consequence of Japan's acceptance of the Allied ultimatum."' Konoe also believed that reform 
s Lawrence Beer & John Maki, From Imperial Myth to Democracy: Japan's Two Constitutions. 1889-2002 (Boulder: University Press of 
Colorado, 2002), 78. 
6
JohnDowe!, Embt'acingDefeat: Japan in the WakeofWorld War II (New York: W.W. Norton& Company, 1999)pp. 77 & 78. 
7 
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was best implemented from within, and that he was the man to do it. After speaking with General 
MacArthur and receiving an ambiguous commission to do so, Konoe began a constitutional 
review process that outlasted the Higashikuni Cabinet8, but he failed nonetheless. Konoe's 
project was the victim of changing policies in Washington, where policy makers became weary of 
his backroom politics. Additionally, the new Cabinet under Baron Shidehara Kijuro began its own 
constitutional reform project under the aegis of Matsumoto Joji, another minister without 
portfolio. Although Konoe's draft, completed shortly before his suicide (spurred by rumors of his 
impeding arrest regarding war crime allegations), never influenced any further constitutional 
drafts, it is a testament to how quickly the internal process of constitutional reform began in 
The Shidehara Cabinet's constitutional review process was likewise doomed from the 
start. It was conducted in near secrecy, even from most Cabinet members. Additionally. 
Matsumoto Joji was a conservative reactionary concerned with preserving the Imperial system. 
Matsumoto believed that the 1889 Meiji Constitution required only minor adjustments to satisfY 
Allied requirements for democracy and civil h"berty. His influence was increased by GHQ and 
SCAP policy to maintain a bands-off stance "because it preserved the fiction that the Japanese 
government was acting voluntarily."10 He pressed his personality onto the team of professors, 
lawyers and politicians assembled to help him. The Committee produced two constitutional 
drafts. One, drafted almost entirely by Matsumoto himself, rewrote the Meiji Constitution with 
8
The Higashikuni Cabinet collapsed in early October, 1946, following a SCAP Directive on Civil Liberties and the Purging of militaristic 
elements within Japen. See paper oo Demilitarizatioo of Japan above. 
9 Hellegers, 438-460. 
10Ibid, 468. 
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some minor changes in terms -- deleting references to 'Imperial' Japan, for instance. 11 Other 
members of his committee created a second draft, slightly more reformist, yet in American eyes 
not nearly enough so. Matsumoto never presented the second draft to the Shidehara Cabinet for 
discussion. He wanted to maintain control over what he began to view as his own private 
constitution writing convention. Later on, this second and lesser debated draft emerged as the 
turning point of Japan's constitutional history in an entirely unexpected fashion. 
Meanwhile, numerous political parties were drafting their own draft constitutions. 
"[S]ome, like that of the Socialist Party. were quite h'beral, and others, h'ke those of the 
Progressive and the Liberals, were quite limited. There was no cont.act between the Japanese 
government and SCAP on this matter."12 MacArthur's exclusive reliance on official channels 
within the Japanese government became a liability in this case. By neglecting to consuh other 
political parties and their drafts, SCAP effectively closed its eyes to potential alternatives. These 
alternatives might have offered backdoor routes to constitutional reform that avoided overt 
American intrusion into the constitution writing process. 13 
Further guidance from Washington regarding constitutional reform in Japan arrived in 
January, 1946. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Directive 228 (SWNCC 228) 
spelled out the direction and destination of constitutional reform required, as well as MacArthur's 
authority to encourage it. On one hand, "the Japanese should be encouraged to abolish the 
Emperor Institution or to reform it along more democratic lines," while at the same time the 
II 
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Supreme Commander should order the reforms "only as a last resuh."14 SWNCC 228 also stated 
that the final Japanese governmental structure must reflect the ''freely expressed will of the 
Japanese people."15 In other words, reforms initiated in closed committees, unknown even to 
many Cabinet members themselves, aJready had one strike against them. 
As the Matsumoto Committee completed its drafts in early February~ 1946, Nishiyama 
RyU.zO, a wandering reporter searching for a scoop, found the second and more reformist of the 
two lying on a table in the Conunittee's office. Shortly after 'borrowing' and copying the draft, 
the proposed constitution appeared on the front page ofMainichi Shibun, a widely read paper, 
and from there made its way to the Government Section (GS) ofSCAP via the Kyooo and Jiji 
news services. General Courtney Whitney, the influential head ofGS, reJayed the draft to 
MacArthur and stated that it left "substantially unchanged the status of the Emperor with all rights 
of sovereignty vested in him. " 16 Ahhough American policy allowed the retention of the Emperor 
in some form, he was to become a figurehead. These Matsumoto Committee proposals, revealed 
to American officials unexpectedly and publicly, were unacceptable. 
Following some confusion on the extent ofSCAP's powers to direct the actual drafting of 
constitutions,17 MacArthur, on 3 February, 1946, directed General Whitney and the GS staffto 
create a model constitution to direct Japanese efforts. The Shibun scoop catalyzed SCAP's 
resolve to intervene. MacArthur presented Whitney a short list of requirements that guided GS in 
14
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15
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its unofficial constitutional convention: 1, •'The Emperor is at the head of state ... His duties and 
powers will be ... responsible to the basic will of the people"; 2, "War as a sovereign right of the 
nation is abolished"; and finally, 'The feudal system of Japan will cease ... Pattern budget after 
British system. "18 MacArthur also stated a preference for a unicameral legislature, because in 
Japan's bicameral legislature of the time, the upper house was composed of Peers, part of the 
feudal system and this house was slated for dissolution. OS considered the unicameral legislature 
a bargaining chip with the Japanese, American officials had no objection to a bicameral body 
provided both houses were democratically elected. In seven days, OS completed its draft 
constitution in complete secrecy. 
The OS draft reflected a parliamentary System of government in deference to Japan's 
constitutional history. It focused on popular sovereignty and civil liberties, expanded suffiage to 
women and created a powerful unicameral Diet that could resist executive veto. The OS draft 
included provisions for local self-government, a radically new concept to the Japanese. Perhaps 
the most noteworthy portion of the constitution is the now famous Article 9, the renunciation of 
war. 19 Following MacArthur's approval with one minor modification on the inviolability of civil 
rights, the draft became Japan's model constitution. 
On 13 February, General Whitney presented the model constitution to stunned Japanese 
officials. Matswnoto, Foreign Minister Yoshida and the Prime Minister's confidant Shirasu JirO 
expected the discussion to focus on the merits of Matsumoto's draft. Instead they found their 
efforts rejected and a complete counter-proposal written by foreigners in their hands. Whitney 
18R"cbard F" w· . 1 mn, mners m Peace. 95. 
19
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forcefully presented the model, implicitly stating that its acceptance was crucial to preserve the 
Emperor's person, and explicitly threatening to present the model to the Japanese body politic 
should they refuse. 20 As expected, the Cabinet agreed to consider the model, with some 
reservation regarding the unicameral nature of the proposed legislature.21 
Over the next week, Matsumoto fought a rearguard action on behalf of his draft, and 
submitted an explanatory note that he believed would alleviate American objections. 'These 
efforts failed; American officials adamantly refused his appeals. Matsumoto attempted to hide his 
failure; not unti119 February did the entire Cabinet even become aware of the American model! 
Their collective reaction was shock and revulsion- Shidehara wanted to reject it. Shidehara, at a 
meeting with MacArthur that same day, expressed concern about the renunciation of war, a 
provision the Cabinet found particularly distasteful MacArthur remained steady and continued to 
deflect Japanese attempts to alter the revolutionary document to their liking. On the 22Dd, 
Whitney met with Yoshida, Matsumoto and Shirasu again and let them know that although the 
essential nature of the model was unalterable, ''modifications in form might be permitted to make 
the meaning clearer or to conform with Japanese procedure. "22 Wnitney also conceded that a 
democratically elected bicameral legislature was acceptable. With no other options, Matsumoto 
agreed to redraft the American model into a Japanese constitution. 
Matsumoto attempted to dominate the process of translating the American model into 
Japanese without informing anyone of his intent. When Matsumoto submitted the complete 
20
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redraft to SCAP on 4 March, a marathon re-translation back into English began; it lasted thirty 
hours. American officials were dismayed as there-translation progressed, finding in Matsumoto's 
work subtle - though substantive - changes. For instance, "after a lengthy polemic with Kades [an 
American military official key in the drafting process] and the American translators over whether 
the Cabinet gave its 'advice and consent' (h6hitsu to kyman) or merely 'counsel' (hclzitsu) to the 
Emperor, Matsumoto burst forth in his own 'broken Eng]ish' to ask the Americans if they had 
come to Japan to remake his country's language as well as its constitution."23 
These cultural collisions continued until Matsumoto left in anger, leaving further 
translation to his key aides, Sato Tatsu and Shirasu JirO. Still, translation disputes continued over 
seemingly simple concepts such as the definition of 'people.' In the former Meiji Constitution 
people were referred to as shinmin, or subjects. The Foreign Ministry used jinmin in portions it 
redrafted, the word commonly used in translations of the U.S. Constitution; Matsumoto's draft 
utilized the archaic term kokumin, roughly translated as 'country people,' a term deemed less in 
opposition to the Emperor, as well as being more nationalistic. Variations in the use of the word 
'people' would later deny some basic rights to thousands of nationals in Japan. The concept of 
'sovereignty' itself also constituted a point of contention when Shidebara's delegation attempted 
to substitute the word shiko, an ambiguous word not in common use in government, for the 
commonly understood shuken. This minor difference meant the Ametican draft read, "sovereign 
will of the People," whereas the Shidehara draft read "supreme will of the People." Matsumoto 
wanted to avoid transferring sovereignty to the people.24 The Americans conceded leo/cumin, but 
23 Hcllegers, We, the J!!J)!!llCSe People. 539. 
24Kosdt~ The Bir1h of Japan's Postwar Constitution. lll-113. 
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in the end shuken was used rather than the obfuscatory shik6.25 One negative resuh of the 
kokumin concession was that it allowed the Japanese officials to succeed in a feat of"linguistic 
subterfuge ... denying equal civil rights to the hundreds of thousand of resident ex-colonial 
subjects, including Taiwanese and especially Koreans.'"26 Although this mistake was rectified by 
the Japanese themselves in the 1950s, it represents the dangers of cross-cultural translation. 
Matsumoto presented the draft to the Shidehara Cabinet for approv~ who then 
resubmitted it to SCAP for public approval prior to its publication in Japanese newspapers and 
debate in the Diet.27 By this slight ofhand SCAP hoped to avoid the image of forcing the 
constitution on Japan. Suspicions abounded, due to the radical difference between this new draft 
and the Matsumoto draft scooped by the Mainichi Shibun in the previous month. 28 
As the Japanese Diet debated the draft constitution, American officials allowed much 
greater modifications than they had in secret. The bicameral concession was only one such 
modification. The House of Representatives' proposals that SCAP approved included increasing 
the amount of free schooling, immediately abolishing the Peerage system rather than phasing it 
out, increasing local governmental autonomy, increasing the Emperor's ceremonial roles in 
governmental appointment, and increasing the majority necessary to amend the constitution to 
two thirds or more of each house. 29 Because debate within the House of Representatives was an 
open forum, SCAP considered it a representation of the Japanese people's will. This Japanized 
25Jolm Dower, Embracing Defeat, 379-383. 
26Jbid, 394. 
27 At the Cabinet IJIIlding, Prime Minister Shidehara and several Minister-s opcoly wept. 
28Ibid, 394-398. 
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version of MacArthur's draft constitution passed overwhelmingly in both houses of the Japanese 
legislature, including the House of Peers that was abolished by its own vote. The Far Eastern 
Commission, an international body of war time Allies established to oversee occupied Japan by 
the Moscow declaration in 1945, had no choice but to approve this new Japanese constitution 
because it represented the freely expressed will of the Japanese people in accordance with the 
Potsdam Declaration.30 Thus, SCAP's connivance to make the new constitution appear as 
Japanese as possible served two purposes. It avoided both the stain of cultural contamination and 
unwanted Allied intrusion into America's Japan. The Emperor's final decree as sovereign enacted 
the new constitution roughly one year later on the 3n1 ofMay, 1947. 
Although the Japanese Constitution grew into a success, American intervention in its 
genesis was a procedural failure that SCAP attempted to conceal. The Japanese had not, as 
American policy makers stated in the Potsdam Declaration, determined their own government. 
This intervention might have been avoided had SCAP provided much more clear constitutional 
requirements earlier in the occupation. By entrusting constitution writing to clements within 
Japanese society that still believed in the Emperor System of goverrunent - as exemplified by 
Matsumoto - SCAP virtually ensured that the draft produced would attempt to maintain the status 
quo ofthe Meiji Constitution. If the Americans had established a true constitutional convention 
involving Japan's political parties, a more h"beral Japanese draft would have resuhed. MacArthur 
could still have presented his three requirements that guided SCAP's Government Section in their 
drafting process. In either case, however, the linguistic obstacles that faced the occupation 
officials would have been considerable. American officials should avoid this experience of 
30
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constitutional intervention in Iraq. The image of a foreign-imposed constitution in Iraq smacks of 
neocolonialism. and will not likely be accepted by the Iraqi people with that stain. If intervention 
is required for whatever reaso~ the American hand must be hidden as thoroughly. In any case, 
the German experience provides a much more apt model to emulate with an equal amount of 
success. 
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Conclusions: Constitution Writing in Postwar Iraq 
America will dominate post war Iraq in concert with closely allied nations. American 
influence in determining Iraq's constitutional development will also be great. 1 Care must be 
exercised to wield this influence responsibly. In a recent speech. President Bush declared that 
''The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq's new government, 
that choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet we will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced 
by another."2 These words are echo statements in regard to both Germany and Japan prior to 
constitution writing. Yet in Japan, American military government came very close to determining 
the precise form of Japanese government. In Iraq, that situation can be avoided by applying the 
lessons learned during the experience of American military government in postwar Germany and 
Japan. The following initial steps will greatly ease the creation of the constitution writing process 
based on those lessons. 
American officials must initiate constitution writing in Iraq at the regional or state level. 
As a country composed of an amalgamation of ethnicity, culture and religion3, as well as many 
exiled opposition groups waiting to return\ this step will allow individual groupings oflraqis to 
assert their autonomy in the most stable and calm manner possible. U.S. State Department 
sponsored studies among Iraqi exiles indicates that some type of federal government is a 
requirement; therefore some local and regional autonomy is necessary.' As witnessed in 
1K.aren De Young & Peter Slevin, "Full U.S. Control Planned fur Iraq," Washington Post. 2I February 2003, Page A 01; accessed online. 
2Josh Burek, "The Next Battle: Transfunning Iraqi Tyranny to Democracy," Chri.'!tian Science Monitor, 24 Mart-.b 2003, ~online. 
3 Amatzia Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation ofBa'thist Iraq, I968-I989 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 1-30. 
4Tom Zeller, "Iraq's Exiled Opposition: Waiting, Watching, Hoping," The New York Times, 23 March 2003; ICiCCSSed online. 
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Germany, this process of initiating politics at a low level gave occupation officials a sense of 
political development and provided a stepping stone to a national constitution convention. In 
Japan, where military government drove for a national constitution quickly and at the national 
level, occupation officials failed to detennine these political trends and hence did not foresee the 
entrenched resistance to a fresh constitution freed of the Meiji's failings. State or regional 
constitution writing provides the Iraqis a democratic opening where competition between regions 
is not yet present. This will reduce the possibility of a grid-locked constituent assembly at the 
national level that is concerned first and foremost with which regions are dominant. The example 
of regional German cooperation stemming from the early establishment of Liindem is a case in 
point. The regional governments established as a result of these constitutions will also provide a 
platform from which Iraqis can draft their national constitution. 
Any Iraqi constituent assembly should be composed of representatives from the majority 
of Iraq's autonomous groups elected from state legislatures established following regional 
constitution writing; Iraqi exiles should be allowed to participate, but not dominate this 
constituent assembly. Disaster resulted in Japan, where military government attempted to focus 
its constitution writing at the upper echelons of Japanese government, through the officials of the 
Imperial Regime. Because ofthe Japanese government's attachment to the old regime, an 
acceptable democratic constitution did not result. The Japanese officials attempted to maintain 
the status quo of the Imperial system Germany's constituent assembly, the Parliamentary 
Council, represented various political parties from different regions, and formed the basis for a 
cohesive national West German government. These individuals had no attachment to Nazi 
disgrace. The parties and regions worked together to form a democratic and German 
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constitution. Military government in Iraq must seek to emulate the German occupation, and 
encourage the participation of independent political parties in Iraqi constitution writing. 
The question oflraq's many exiles posses a much more pressing question today than the 
postwar world that followed the demise of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. The Iraqi middle 
and upper middle class embarked on an exodus of unprecedented proportions in modern history 
during Saddam's brutal regime and is "estimated to compromise as much as 15% of the 
populace".6 A recent convocation of the exile groups coving the full spectrum oflraq's ethnic 
and religious kaleidoscope met in November of2002, and proposed that a postwar Iraqi 
government be composed of an executive committee and a constituent assembly, the later of 
which would contain 50% Iraqi exiles. 7 Exiles need to be integrated back into Iraqi society, but 
they should not be allowed to dominate it. A more reasonable figure for representation is 20-30% 
at most. Future elections may very well increase these numbers, but the initial postwar years must 
be led by Iraqis who have lived recent years in Iraq. 
Because Iraq's broken constitutional history is almost a half century past, it is unlikely 
that any Iraqi constituent assembly will attempt to resurrect a constitution from the past. 
Germany and Japan present opposing cases regarding the acceptability of utilizing constitutional 
frameworks from the past. In Japan, MacArthur and his advisors believed that any association 
with the Meiji Constitution was unacceptable. The Weimar Constitution of Germany, however, 
did provide a rough framework for Basic Law. The reason for this dichotomy is simple. In 
Japan, the Meiji Constitution gave militarists a basis for Imperial War, and constituted the basis 
6
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for Japanese wartime government. Despite a military coup, Japan nominally functioned under the 
Meiji Constitution throughout its wartime period beginning in the 1930's. In Germany, the Nazis 
systematically destroyed the Weimar Constitution before consuming the government entirely. 
Therefore the Weimar Constitution did not carry the stigma of a Nazi wartime document. It did 
carry the stigma of a failed constitution. Basic Law was a new constitution only based on the 
Weimar Constitution; the Matsumoto Committee in Japan merely reworded the old Meiji 
Constitution. The last Iraqi constitution was written as a provisional document in May, 1964 and 
focused on Arab unity rather than any particular internal freedoms and rights; ind~ the 
provisional constitution attempted to achieve just the opposite. The President at the time, 'Adb 
al-Salam 'Arif desired to transform of Iraq into "a country of Egypt's solidarity and homogeneity'' 
for his own purposes of political control. 8 Because these goals are so outdated, it is highly 
unlikely that an attempt to return to the 1964 provisional constitution will occur. 
Ensuring that the Iraqi constitution is vital enough to withstand future abuse without 
American military government actua1Jy writing the constitution, requires that the following 
recommendations are implemented: 
The constituent assembly will require specific guidance from American military 
government on the substantive requirements of any final constitution. In both Germany and 
Japan, we witnessed a significant failure of authorities to accomplish this. Specific guidance will 
help avoid a situation where American intervention is needed to create a viable and acceptable 
constitution. American officials must avoid a situation were direct constitution writing is 
attempted, as in Japan. With modem communication and media, it is highly dubious whether 
8
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American officials would be able to hide their intervention in Iraq, as they did in Japan ofthe 
1940s. American officials in Germany attempted a public intervention because of disagreements 
over the Gennan interpretation of federalism. The Gennan people resented this intrusion. In 
Japan's case study, we saw that military government concealed its own dominant hand in the 
constitution writing process, knowing full well that the Japanese needed to believe that their 
constitution was not a foreign imposition. American officials should carefully craft their 
requirements beforehand to negate the need to meddle later on. 
If American officials want specific relationships between the States and the central 
government, in any fields, these relationships need to be defined quickly and clearly as federal in 
nature. For instance, finance and tax powers will constitute an early point of contention. This 
issue will directly affect where Iraq's substantial oil revenues are distributed. Because money 
equals power, the ability of either state governments or the central government to completely 
dominate the other cannot be tolerated. If states are to have powers in concett with a central 
government under a federal system, a balance is necessary. American officials need to establish 
clear and :fu.ir guidelines to prevent abuse by either state or central governments. Germany, a 
nation without a sole connnodity of such value and importance, presented a case study of how 
financial and taxation issues led to an attempt by military government to impose its will. In Iraq 
this potentiality is increased, and America military government needs to avoid this bone of 
contention through clear guidelines. 
Critical to Iraq 's federal nature is the definition of internal state boundaries that 
encourage a degree of autonomy rather than diminish it. Iraqi exile groups propose divisions 
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primarily along geographic lines and roughly along ethnic lines.9 This solution is only acceptable 
if the vast majority of ethnic enclaves are not broken apart. For instance, a Kurdish state in the 
north and a Shia state in the south must not be broken into pieces. For any real autonomy from 
the central government to grow, these political, ethnic and religious groups cannot be divided. As 
opposed to Gennany, where the state ofPrussia was abolished to combat the perceived 
militaristic nature of German Society, Iraqi states must be left geographically intact and 
autonomous. 
Fears of a divisive Shia and Kurdish state need to be realized for what they are: fears, 
not realities. American policy makers will further stabilize the nation rather than weaken it by 
allowing these groups the autonomy and freedom denied them by a long history of repression. 
Any calls for a return to the 'benevolent' dictatorships of the Nuri and Qasirn era should be 
rejected. Constitutions created during these eras were not written with freedom as a go~ and 
neither were the actions of their writers. These very 'benevolent' dictatorships are the very 
substance that prohibited a democratic history in Iraq. 1° Clearly a break with the past is 
necessary; "the 'ownership' of a new Iraq would have to be shared; its vocation would have to be 
a new social and political contract between state and society and among the principal communities 
of the land." 11 
9 Strobel and Landy, "Group ofExiles. .. " accessed online via Lexis Nexis. 
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Military government must determine requiremenis regarding the balance of power 
between Iraqi legislative, judicial and executive branches early on. Intervention later on is a 
messy affair. In Japan, it required a nearly complete assumption of constitution writing 
responsibilities by military government. Military government in Germany attempted to alter the 
balance, but eventually determined the ~1ruggle became too costly and gave the Germans what 
they wanted. This guidance is a key to avoiding unwanted intrusion in the constitution writing 
process. Japan lacked it more than Germany did, and both would have benefitted from better 
instruction and assistance. In Iraq, where fear of American and western cultur-al intrusion is an 
even greater factor, America must undertake to present its criteria for an acceptable balance of 
power very early in the constitution writing process. This will allow Iraqis to debate how best to 
achieve the criteria without the shadow of America's hand forcing them on any particular path to 
that destination. 
When reviewing any constitution submitted by the Iraqi constituent assemblies, great care 
must be taken when translating. Allowing simple misunderstandings can deny entire segments of 
the population their full rights as citizens. This was the case with former colonial subjects Jiving 
in Japan proper, a tragic example not corrected until some years later. Should Iraqi constituent 
assemblies attempt to engage in 'linguistic subterfuge' for whatever reason, American military 
government must be ready to translate quickly and clearly. For this reason a well qualified 
translation staff is a crucial requirement. 
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